South Pacific Forum: 'responding to the needs of the Member States'

Although an accountant by training, leremiah Tabai has never had the opportunity to practise his profession, having pursued a successful political career instead since 1974. In 1978, he was annointed head of government in Kiribati and a year later he became his country's first President, when it achieved independence. He held this position for 12 years. In 1991, he took up the top post in one of the South Pacific's key regional bodies, the Forum Secretariat, which is based in Suva, Fiji. During a recent Courier visit to the region, we had the opportunity to interview the Secretary General. Our discussion was wide-ranging, covering issues such as the Forum Secretariat's role, the economic challenges facing the South Pacific, and the development of regional links with Australia, New Zealand and Asia. We began by asking Mr Tabai to outline the objectives of the organisation that he heads.

- Like many other organisations in the region, the Forum was established essentially to try and assist the development process of the Member States. At the time it was set up, there was already an organisation in existence - the South Pacific Commission - which dates back to 1947. But there was a feeling that we needed an organisation that was not just restricted to economic issues; that could talk about other matters with a bearing on the development of the region.

In the early years, when the organisation was called the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), the focus was heavily on trying to assist the trade and economic development of the member countries. Later, the name was changed to the Forum Secretariat and its role evolved.

· In what way ?

-It has evolved in seeking to respond to the needs of the Member States. It started as a very small bureau essentially dealing, as I said, with trade and economic issues. Subsequently, it moved into areas like energy, civil aviation, maritime questions and telecommunications. It also became more involved in political issues. We have a division which deals specifically with these.

1995 was a very important year in the history of the Forum. We had a review of the organisation, looking at ways we could perform better and taking account of the changes in the region and the world at large. The fundamental recommendation in the report which came out of that review was that the Secretariat should focus mainly in future on poliy-related issues, in the areas of trade and investment, economics and international relations. This report was discussed and endorsed at the last Forum in Madang, Papua New Guinea.

· Does this mean, in practice, a withdrawal from project activity ?

-It may. The essential focus of the work will be providing policy advice to countries. Having said this, there should still be some project work. For instance, we will be engaged in a programme to provide assistance for importers, particularly in the small island countries. The idea is to help people- who may not be familiar with all the legal requirements-to learn how to get into the business. This will involve running a workshop and inviting people with expertise to pass on their knowledge. So even though the focus will be on policy issues, there will still be room for project-type activities where needed -so long as these fit in with the policy priorities.

· You mentioned the fact that the Forum now deals with political questions. Although the issue may now be seen as 'water under the bridge' to what extent was the Forum Secretariat involved in the diplomatic disagreement over French nuclear testing ?

- We were very much involved from the beginning. In 1991, when the French testing was not underground but atmospheric, the region, at a Forum meeting, came out strongly in opposition to the tests. Right up to our last meeting in Madang, the subject was always a major item on the agenda, and we left France in no doubt as to the resolve of our region.

When the new President took the decision to resume testing after a gap of several years, I was in the group from the South Pacific that went to France to express our views to French ministers, face-to-face. Our team was led by the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who was President of the Forum. And when the tests began again, the Chairman took a decision suspending the dialogue and partner status of France with the Forum. So, as you see, we have been heavily involved in the issue.

· What resources does the Forum have at its disposal and where does the money come from ?

- An important source of funds is our members' contributions. These tend to be used to cover the operational costs of the organisation. Then of course, there are the funds made available by our donors. The main ones are obviously Australia and New Zealand but there are many other countries and international organisations who provide assistance. The EU, of course, is an important partner. There was also a private donor who funded our conference centre.

· How many people are employed in the Secretariat ?

-Around 80, all based here in Suva. Most of these are support staff.

· What is the current state of relations between the Forum Secretariat and the main donors ?

-I would say our relations are good. We have an extensive mechanism for consultation with the donors. Every two years, we invite them here for a dialogue. We talk about the key issues and discuss ways in which they can assist us. There is also usually a dialogue associated with the Forum (ministerial) meetings. In September this year, after the Forum meeting, we will have more discussions with our main partners such as the EU, Canada, France, Japan and the UK. I should mention too the close links we have with international organisations like the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the IMF.

I think it is fair to say that the Forum Secretariat is seen as a particularly important organisation in the region. That is why donors are quite keen to be seen assisting us in what we do.

· What are the key development issues facing the South Pacific nations ?

- Development is quite a difficult process for our region. There are various international reports (particularly from the World Bank) - that describe how we have fared over the last few years. If you compare our performance with the Caribbean countries, for example, you find that we have not done nearly so well.

We face a number of problems. First, there is the fact that we are so small. Small communities find it much more difficult than large ones to achieve development. You need to have the market and the critical mass to do all the things that are needed and we lack these. A second, related point is that our countries are very isolated from the rest of the world. It is true that here in Fiji, there are quite good connections, but if you go to Tuvalu, Kiribati or Niue, you will soon discover how difficult it is to get out. And if you are so isolated in terms of communication, how can you hope to increase your exports ? How can you airfreight your fish to Japan when there is no aircraft available-or the one that is available is not fast enough to ensure that the product is still fresh when it arrives?

On this question, one of the things we are increasingly realising is the need to do more in terms of human resource development. We all recognise that, without an educated population and workforce, it is very hard to achieve the development that we are aiming for. To be fair, if you compare the literacy rates here with those of many other countries, say in Africa, they are not at all bad. Our literacy levels are quite high. But I think we have a long way to go in acquiring problem-solving skills of the type needed to compete internationally. We are now talking with the EU about how we can utilise funding from the second protocol of Lomé IV. And I suspect that human resource development will remain high on the agenda.

· Is that view shared by the European side ?

-I think so. l have a feeling that they will support it because it is so obvious. If you develop human skills, you are better placed when it comes to problem-solving.

Going back to the key development issues, another point is the lack of natural resources. This is less of a difficulty for countries like Fiji or Papua New Guinea, but it certainly affects the small island states. It hardly needs saying that if you don't have the resources in the first place, it is much harder to develop.

Finally, I think there is a question of how the Pacific region can get a better return on the resources it does have. This theme of 'managing our resources' was discussed by the Forum in Brisbane two years ago. Fisheries is probably the most important area here. The question is how we can earn more from this than we are currently doing- and there is no easy answer. Likewise in the forestry sector. We have to ensure that logging is done on a sustainable basis. But we must also recognise that leaders of the Pacific nations are under pressure. On the one hand, they are trying to take a lona-term view. but they are also striving to tackle the immediate problems. In an ideal world, our region would obtain a far better return on our resources, and that is something that we have to work on.

Having said all this, I don't think one should be too pessimistic. This region is still a very good place to live in. That is clearly reflected in the number of visitors we get. The 'South Seas' still have a special connotation that draws people here.

· You effectively have two 'genera/' regional organisations, with overlapping memberships, covering the South Pacific -the Forum, and the South Pacifc Commission (SPC). Do you think there is room for bath ? Do you complement each other or is there a rivalry ?

-We have more than two regional organisations. We also have SPREP (South Pacifc Regional Environment Programme), the FFA (Forum Fisheries Agency)....

· Yes, but these are specialist bodies with distinct sectoral responsibilities.

-Yes, that's true. In answer to your question, my view is that we have no problem with things as they stand. I was very involved in the debate some years back on the question of what we called an SRO - a single regional organisation. There was a strong push to try and achieve an SRO. The subject was debated for a few years and, in the end, it was possible to resolve the question.

· You mean it was resolved by the idea being abandoned ?

-I suppose it depends on the way you look at it. The outcome was a decision to leave the regional organisations as they are but with the establishment of a mechanism to ensure they work together more effectively. This mechanism is called SPOCC-the South Pacific Organisations Coordinating Committee. It is a meeting of heads of regional organisations which happens at least once a year. We talk about the issues that are common to our mandate and work out ways of doing things better. SPOCC has been operating for six or seven years now and I think it works fairly well. There is, after all, no conflict in our underlying objectives. So my answer here is no, I don't see any problem. I don't see any rivalry between us. It is a question of seeing how we can work together to achieve the goals that we share.

· In the European Union, the fundamental goal, set out in the Treaty, is to move towards 'ever-closer union' We have been doing this in fits and starts over the past 35 years. Do you see the Forum perhaps taking on a similar role here-as the focus for economic, and perhaps ultimately, political integration in the South Pacifc ?

- I think it is too early to speculate. We already have a number of sub-groups in the region like the MSG, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, whose members are the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji (admitted last year). Further north, we have the Micronesian grouping which brings together Nauru, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands and Kiribati. These groups meet outside the Forum framework and they essentially have a common aim which is to work more closely together. I think they feel it is easier to do it at this level because they are closer to each other and have more in common.

As for the Forum Secretariat, you can never tell what may come in the future. On balance, however, I think at the moment that integration is a long way off. Having said this, you do sometimes hear people putting the idea forward. There is, for example, something called the CER system, which stands for 'closer economic relations' between Australia and New Zealand. There have been suggestions that it might be possible to enlarge this grouping.

Looking at closer economic cooperation, and the general dismantling of trade barriers, we also need to recognise the growing importance of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) for the region. We are trying strengthen our links with the APEC countries and in October, we will be establishing a trade office in Japan.

· You mean a Forum Secretariat office ?

-Yes, in Tokyo. We are also talking with the Chinese and will probably end up with an office in Beijing. This is all part of our attempt to integrate ourselves with the Asean region.

Interview by Simon Homer

Mission statement of the Forum Secretariat

The mission of the Forum Secretariat is to enhance the economic and social well being of the people of the South Pacific, in support of the efforts of the national governments. The Secretariat has particular responsibility to facilitate, develop and maintain cooperation and consultation between member governments.

The Secretariat must pursue its mission in accordance with the directives of the Forum and within its mandated areas of operation. it undertakes political and economic activities, regional in nature and complementary to the activities of the member governments. Its role requires it to act as the secretariat to the Forum and to disseminate the Forum's views, to coordinate activities with other regional institutions in particular through the SPOCC process, and to represent the Forum's interests intemationally, as required.

The MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) symposium was held in Montreal from 22-24 May. It brought together some 40 African mining ministers, most of the important donor agencies and representatives of around 25 mining companies. MIGA, which is a specialised agency of the World Bank, promotes the flow of private investment to developing countries. It provides insurance against political risks and assists member countries in attracting foreign investment.

The purpose of the symposium was to attract investors from all over the world in order to exploit the rich mining possibilities offered by many African states. Several of the countries that attended went to considerable effort to present themselves well, and it was evident that some are quickly learning what it takes to attract foreign investors.

The climate for mining investment in most African states has improved tremendously over the last two to three years. Most countries have introduced new mining codes, clearly defining the rights and obligations of foreign investors. State-owned companies are also being privatised, taxation has been made more reasonable and institutions in the mining sector, such as geological surveys, are becoming more efficient.

All this has led to a big increase in exploration for new deposits and a substantial increase in investment. At present, the activity is particularly heavy in West Africa, where many countries have very good gold potential. The European Community is contributing to this development in several ways. The biggest success so far has been the exploration campaign in Mali, funded under that country's Lomé National Indicative Programme (NIP), which led to the discovery of the Sadiola gold deposit. A world-class gold mine will be built here, bringing substantial benefits to the country.

The World Bank has also supported many African countries in their efforts to reform the legal and administrative framework for the mining industry. An important element, however, in attracting mining companies is the availability of good geological data. This is a very expensive activity, which does not bring immediate returns, if at all. So it is not appropriate to finance this through bank loans. The NlPs and SYSMIN Fund, on the other hand, are instruments that are well-suited to this kind of work. The Community has already financed a series of airborne geophysical surveys in Botswana and Namibia -to mention just two examples-and a new Sysmin project is currently being prepared for Burkina Faso.

The Commission Unit responsible for Mining Cooperation and Sysmin (VIIIl.B.5) was represented at the symposium. Its main purpose for being there was to present the functioning of Sysmin and the Community's cooperation in the field of mining to ACP ministers, mining companies and other donor agencies.

Current state of the mining sector

The mining sector is currently very active. Exploration in West Africa doubled between 1993 and 1995 and new mines are being opened all the time. A lot of this new activity is to be found in the gold sector. This is mainly due to the development of cheaper production methods combined with a much more positive investment climate in many African countries. A gold mine takes less time to reach the production stage than, for example, a copper mine, with the former being far less dependent on good infrastructure. Outside the gold sector, activity is much more subdued. While base-metal prices are at a reasonable level, the pay-back period is much longer and the lack of suitable infrastructure kills many projects.

For many countries, mining is a key area in the growth of the private sector. State-ownad mines are being privatised and the new mines that are being opened have little or no state participation. Foreign investors are bringing in the most up-to-date mining technologies and business methods, and they are faced with the need to train local people in technical and business skills. Supporting the mining sector is clearly an efficient way of supporting private sector development.

SYSMIN's future role

Given that most metals are currently fetching quite high prices, it is probable that relatively few ACP countries will be eligible for SYSMIN assistance over the next two to three years. The viability of most existing mines is not thought to be under threat and they should continue to be profitable. Thus, countries that are heavily dependent on mining should not experience severe losses in export income, which in turn means that relatively few SYSMIN requests are expected during the period of Lomé IV's second financial protocol. At the same time, the financial allocation for SYSMIN has been increased from ECU 48Om to ECU 575m.

When trying to attract new mining investors, it is essential for a country to have good geological information. Private companies are normally unwilling to undertake much general prospect ion, such as airborne geophysical surveys, because it is very expensive and, if they do, it is usually limited to very small areas.

At present, companies are tending to restrict their activities to areas for which general information is already available. These points were raised by several of the mining companies that attended the symposium.

But the present mining boom is not going to last for ever. Metal prices are volatile and, with the next downturn in the business cycle, a decline in metal prices will surely follow. So it is essential to prepare the basis for future mining activities by collecting general data. Given that a significant part of the SYSMIN allocation may remain unused because of a lack of requests, it would be worthwhile to consider whether a part could be reallocated to prepare general geological data for mining activities in the next century.

F. B.-H.

by Hans van de Veen

Can the EU-ACP relationship be used to strengthen the dialogue between Europe and the main victims of climate change ? And can the Lomé Convention be one of the tools to promote climate protection measures, as well as the implementation of the Climate

Treaty? These questions will be considered in depth at a hearing on climate derange scheduled for the next ACP-EU Joint Assembly, to be held in the last week of September 1996.

Periods of heavy rain have always been part of normal life in Fiji. But the latest rains were different, says counsellor Taina Tudau of the Fiji Embassy in Brussels. 'They were much more extreme than what we were used to, and caused heavy damage. Normally it took several days of heavy rain before the floods came up. This time, the water flooded the islands almost immediately the rain began to fall.' Mrs Tudau sees two main causes for the recent flooding. First, there is heavy deforestation on the islands, causing widespread erosion. But she is sure there was another reason for the recent damage: 'In the Pacific we know the local climate is changing. We see that the sea is rising. We are experiencing more extreme weather events. There can be no doubt that global warming is already going on.'

Fiji is a prominent member of the Alliance of Small Island States (Aosis), the group of 36 nations which feel particularly threatened by global warming. At the first Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Berlin in March 1995, Aosis called for industrialised nations to reduce their C02 emissions by 20% by 2005 (based on 1990 levels). At the end of the conference, the 150 national delegations agreed to begin negotiations on targets for industrialised nations to cut emissions in the early years of the next century.

So intentions may be good, but in practice not much has been done yet. The EU, for its part, risks losing credibility if firm action is not taken soon. According to a recent Commission White Paper on energy policy, the use of energy within the Union will increase by 1% a year up to 2020. Failing 'any strong policy interventions', the paper says, emissions of carbon dioxide are likely to show a 'substantial increase' during this period. Says Fiji-counsellor Tudau: 'As small island states we know what's at stake, but there seems to be no feeling of urgency in the rest of the world. We really wonder how long it will take before there is a definite move towards reduction of greenhouse gases.'

EU-ACP cooperation

At the Berlin conference, the ACP countries-led by Aosis but with support from most of the African states -took a constructive and moderate position in the G77. The position adopted by the EU could also be described as moderate, certainly compared to that of other OECD countries. Several observers have pointed to the fact that these two moderate approaches by important blocks within the Climate Convention negotiations offer possibilities for some form of cooperation.

'No doubt the EU represents the most progressive group of countries

within the OECD, although its position is far from sufficient', says Sible Schone, a representative of the World Wide Fund for Nature. 'Besides that, the EU has a special relationship with a large group of developing countries. Quite obviously it will be significant to get a dialogue started between the EU and the ACPs on the subject of climate change.' Currently, there is no such dialogue. 'At the moment we are not in a dialogue with ACP countries on climate change', says Bertil Heerink of the European Commission's Environment Directorate-General who is a member of the EU delegation to the climate negotiations. 'I'm convinced this will happen some day, but first we have to agree on our own goals and measures. I am sure developing countries want us to give priority to this too.'

The special ACP subcommittee to deal with tropical timber, the environment and fisheries, formed after the signing of the revised Lomé IV, only recently started its work. With respect to the global warming issue, it is waiting for the Joint Assembly hearing, according to ambassador Michael King of Barbados, who is a committee member. 'The specific interests of the different regions have to be articulated there, and then some kind of sustained effort has to be initiated.'

The unit for Sustainable Development and Natural Resources in the Development Directorate-General of the Commission (DG VIII) not at present dealing with the subject of climate change. Says Head of Unit, Amos Tincani: 'We have worked on biodiversity and desertification, and we want to do more on the specific environmental problems of small island states. But we have done nothing similar on climate change. This is partly because it is so much a global problem, but the main reason is we simply lack the people and the time to go into it.'

Assembly hearing

At its meeting in Windhoek in March this year, the Joint Assembly adopted a resolution which had been proposed by representatives of 13 small island states. This urged the EU to take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. More specifically, the Commission is being asked to update its climate change strategy for the period post-2000 and to achieve significant reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases over the coming decade and thereafter. The resolution riches on to call for extra assistance to ACP countries in the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Ocean to help them improve their disaster preparedness. The Commission is also urged to accelerate the transfer of appropriate technologies and practices, to enable ACP states to develop coastal zone management strategies and to rehabilitate and protect areas stricken by drought and desertification as well as by hurricanes and floods.

Two representatives of the European Parliament, Maartje van Putter (PES) and Peter Liege (EPP), have been active on the situation of the small island states and climate change for several years. According to Mrs Van Putten, the main effect of the coming Assembly hearing should be to put extra pressure on the Commission to take its responsibility seriously. 'Talking about climate change,' she says, 'one should never forget who is to blame and who, therefore, must take decisive action. A European tax on energy or carbon dioxide would be an important first step, but no more than that.'

Besides influencing the Commission's energy policy, Mrs Van Putten hopes the Assembly hearing will raise public awareness on the climate problem in those ACP countries which are not in the 'small island' category. 'If you are talking about rising sea levels, the African states with low-lying coastal zones face the same problems as the small island countries,' she points out. 'And they also face the problem of desertification and declining food production.'

Integrating the climate dimension

In a recent briefing paperto the Commission, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) concluded that, hitherto, the aid community (including the EU) had not incorporated measures on global warming into their strategic thinking on sustainable development. 'Indeed, the possibility of climate change has been considered of minor importance in comparison to other environmental concerns.' This is hardly surprising, says the London-based institute, as the climate issue has only recently been placed on the international agenda. Moreover, the long-term threat of global warming raises some difficult questions regarding priorities in circumstances where resources are limited. In other words: who wants to spend scarce funds on problems the full effects of which will probably not be felt for another 25 to 50 years? The best way forward, suggests the IIED, is to tackle the apparent conflict between shortterm development priorities and longterm climate protection, by 'integrating the climate dimension' rather than considering climate change as an issue in isolation.

Technology transfer could be a central point, according to WWF's Sible Schone. 'Developing countries see technology transfer as a central theme in the Climate Convention, but the industrialised countries don't give enough weight to these There are a lot of paragraphs about technology transfer in the Convention as well as in Lomé. Now it's time to fill in these commitments.'

Strangely, there are hardly any Lomé projects currently under way in the field of energy efficiency. It is strange because experts have pointed to the large potential in developing countries for cost-effective energy improvement and energy conservation. Improved management could save at least 25% of the energy now being consumed. Quick realisation of this potential would significantly contribute to alleviating environmental ànd development problems.

Henri Martin, energy specialist in DG VIII, agrees a lot more could be done in this field, but he points out: 'We are dependent on requests. If you look at the wording of the Convention, everything has already been said. There are chapters on energy and technology transfer. The problem is that we don't get enough signals back from the ACP countries that these items are a priority for them. I'm afraid sustainable energy or energy efficiency is not high on the agenda of most countries.' Taina Tudau disagrees strongly: 'Our experience is that the projects that could make a difference and contribute to sustainable development, protection of the environment and local sustainable energy production, are found to be too small. It is the donor that sets the conditions for the projects, not us, the small island states.'

New funding?

Can the EU build a credible policy linking climate and development cooperation, without reserving extra money? Not surprisingly, there is disagreement on this question. In Brussels, officials are inclined to point to possibilities that are already there but not being used. Amos Tincani, for instance, observes that 'there are budgets for this kind of problem under Lomé. We have provisions specially targeted for the islands'. He mentions regional budgets in particular: 'A lot can be started at the regional level which then trickles down to the national level. But after producing fine resolutions, everybody seems to forget the work still needs to be done. The idea is: 'oh yes, we can do it, provided it is with fresh money'. We say: a lot more can be done with existing budgets and instruments.'

Maartje van Putten, from the Parliament, says the discussion should not be 'dominated by southern demands for additional money'. She agrees that ACP countries could make better use of existing funds and possibilities, such as, for instance, the funds for intra ACP cooperation. But counsellor Tudau points to the fact that the Climate Convention urges industrialised countries to support the response of developing countries to climate problems through 'new and additional' money, besides the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and expertise.

There is a financial mechanism built into the Climate Convention, which is administered by the Global Environmental Facility, to cover additional costs of appropriate measures. But much more could be done by the aid community, including the EU, according to Mrs Tudau. 'Most European countries will not succeed in stabilising, let alone reducing, their emissions. In reaction to this, as ACP countries we should say: European Union, you are not fulfilling your obligations. You have to try harder and you have to set extra money aside to compensate for the damage this is doing to us.

H.v.d.V.

There were no real surprises or unexpected developments at the ACP-EU Council meeting which took place in Apia, Western Samoa, on 27 and 28 June, 1996. The session was preceded by an ACP Council, which saw the adoption of three important decisions. The first of these was the appointment of a new ACP Secretary-6eneral, Mr Ng'andu P. Magande of Zambia. The post had been vacant for some time, following deadlock within the ACP Group over a successor to Berhane Ghebray (see issue 155 of The Courier, p.6). The ministers also agreed to hold a summit of ACP heads of government in Libreville, Gabon, during the second half of 1997. This meeting is expected to focus heavily on the future of ACPEU relations once the present Lomé Convention has expired.

In the substantive area, the ACP Council adopted a resolution deploring the suspension of cooperation with Equatorial Guinea. Ministers urged the European Union to make use of the procedure in Article 366a of the revised Lomé Convention, and to set in train the consultation procedure envisaged in this provision.

This issue was raised again by the ACP side at the subsequent ACP-EU Council. This meeting, which was presided over by Mrs Toya (Italian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) and Mr Syamujaye (Zambia's Trade Minister) had a relatively light agenda. There was a discussion about the Commission proposal for a directive on the use of vegetable fats, other than cocoa fat, in chocolate (see issue 158 of The Courier, p.35). Somalia also featured in the debate, with representatives agreeing on the need to find ways of allowing this country to benefit from Lomé Convention provisions. The civil conflict in Somalia, and the absence of an effective central administration have prevented the deployment of regular development aid for many years, although significant amounts of emergency assistance have been and are still being provided.

In addition, the ACP-EU Council approved two reports drawn up by the development finance cooperation subcommittee and commodities sub-committee respectively. Representatives were able to reach a compromise on two outstanding points of contention in the resolution on development finance relating to tenders and the dissemination of the user's guide.

Note was taken of the number of countries that have so far lodged instruments of ratification for the revisad Lomé Convention (Mauritius agreement). At the time of the Apia meeting, only nine countries had ratified: seven on the ACP side (Barbados, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius and Solomon Islands) and two EU Member States (Denmark and Sweden). Appeals were made for the contracting parties to speed up their ratification procedures so that the Eighth European Development Fund can come on stream as speedily as possible.

The next ACP-EU Council meeting will take place in Luxembourg on 24 and 25 April 1997.

The government of Western Samoa deserves a special mention for the warmth of their hospitality and the efficient way in which they organised the Council meeting. Delegates from all sides were keen to express their appreciation of the host country's efforts, which ensured the smooth running of the various meetings and gave the visitors a real taste of this Pacific country's unique culture. ed. S.H.

New ACP Secretary-General

Ng`andu Peter Magande, is no stranger to the challenge of development at the grassroots. The new Secretary-General of the ACP Group, who was born in 1947, began his working career as a provincial development officer, planning and supervising projects in the Southern Province of his native Zambia. He is an economics graduate of the University of Zambia and also holds a master's degree in agricultural economics from Makerere university, Uganda.

From working in the field, he moved into government administration, rising to the position of Permanent Secretary-a post which he held in a number of ministries. Since the mid-1980s, he has had key jobs in a number of Zambian enterprises (including Managing Director of the Zambia National Commercial Bank) His most recent work has been on a project to develop private sector participation in agricultural input and produce marketing.

by Elisabeth Pape

Kenya has enjoyed rare political stability since independence in 1963. It is one of the most famous holiday destinations in Africa, with abundant wildlife, fine beaches and stunning scenery. But despite having the most advanced economy in East Africa, it is still one of the world's poorest countries. Over 11 million Kenyans live below the poverty line. But better times may be ahead. The Government has embarked on an ambitious reform programme which promises to lay the foundations for strong growth.

The early 1990s marked the worst time in Kenyan history, in economic development terms. Real GDP growth dropped from 4.3% in 1990 to 2.1% in 1991 and was almost zero in 1992 and 1993. This poor performance was due to drought, structural rigidities, lack of monetary discipline, non-enforcement of banking regulations, and reduced donor assistance. While Kenya was used to receiving substantial foreign aid inflows, the present decade began with growing tensions between Government and donors. In the new post-Cold War atmosphere, the latter wanted to see political and economic reforms, and in November 1991 they decided to halt guick-disbursing aid.

Multi-party elections in December 1992 did not immediately restore relations with the donors, in particular as they were accompanied by a lack of fiscal and monetary discipline whose effects threatened economic ruin. Monetary expansion was fuelled, among other things, by discretionary exemptions to Banking Act provisions, which enabled over-borrowing by certain 'political' banks from the Central Bank. In early 1993, things came to a head. Foreign currency reserves were down to just a few weeks of imports, the banking system was on the verge of collapse, and consumer prices had shot up. Against this background, the Government went for a comprehensive, IMF-supported structural adjustment programme.

A number of far-reaching reforms were implemented with unprecedented speed. Exchange restrictions were removed, import licensing was ended, import procedures were made easier and tariffs were reduced. The export license requirement was also lifted and price controls were abolished. In March 1993, the Central Bank (CBK) began to tighten monetary policy. By issuing large amounts of treasury bills, it soaked up most of the excess liquidity which had been injected the previous year. There was also stricter bank supervision and a number of weak financial institutions were closed.

Structural reforms

The Government began structural reforms aimed at reducing its own role in the economy in favour of the private sector. The privatisation programme, begun in 1991, was accelerated. By the end of 1995, the authorities had divested more than half of the 211 non-strategic parastatals-though critics complained the process often lacked transparency. The Government also substantially reduced its fiscal deficit through, above all, an improved revenue policy. The deficit fell from 11.4% of GDP in 1992/93 to 2.5% in 1994/95. The number of civil servants was reduced, mainly through voluntary early retirement, so that, by the end of 1995, the service had been trimmed by more than 30 000 (10% of the payroll).

In 1995, the reform programme lost momentum as proponents of the old and the new systems locked horns. Vested interests stood in the way of more radical reforms. Temporary import bans on maize and sugar were reimposed, key parastatal reforms were delayed and expensive but economically dubious projects were approved outside normal budgetary procedures. These included an international airport in Eldoret, a presidential jet and an identity card project. These further delayed the resumption of balance of payments support by the Bretton Woods Institutions and contributed to the frustration of efforts to improve relations with donors.

The economic crisis peaked in early 1993 and the shilling was sharply devalued. The official rate went from about KSh 36 to the dollar at the end of 1992 to KSh 60 in April 1993. On the market, the currency was being traded at a premium of more than 30% and that continued until July-i.e. about two months after the removal of exchange restrictions. The market premium then started to decline and the two rates converged in mid-October when the shilling stood at 69 to the dollar.

The high interest rate on treasury bills under the liberalised foreign exchange regime was the main reason behind strong currency inflows which began in October 1993. Other factors, whose exact impact is difficult to gauge, included capital flight from neighbouring crisis-torn countries, the international money laundering one normally finds in places with newly liberalised foreign exchange regimes, and a surplus in the current account position. The shilling then started to rise, despite the CBK's massive currency purchases which led to a build up of reserves to the equivalent of six months of imports. The appreciation continued up to October 1994: indeed, at one point, the shilling reached a high of 35 to the dollar.

That was the turning point. Strong import demand, fuelled in particular by a surge in oil imports in the wake of petroleum market liberalisation, and an outflow of portfolio investments due to lower interest rates, weakened the currency. By mid-1995, after two sharp falls, it reached a rate of 56 to the dollar. Since then, it has been relatively stable.

Economic recovery

Real GDP grew by 3% in 1994 and an estimated 5% in 1995. Good weather certainly helped, but the economy also benefited from the Government's reforms. Agriculture, the mainstay, grew by 2.8% in 1994 and by more than 5% in 1995. This compares with negative growth rates in 1992-93, when the sector was hard hit by bad weather. Elsewhere, the trends were more mixed. Many producers for the local market were affected by trade liberalisation and, in 1994, by the strong shilling. The former created a highly competitive environment almost overnight-after years of cosy protectionism. For cloth manufacturers, the liberalisation of imports of second-hand clothing further aggravated the problem. In 1994, the clothing sector's output dropped 35%. Tourism, the main foreign exchange earner, fared quite well in volume terms in 1994 despite the strong shilling. But while turnover may have gone up, it is likely that many operators did not earn enough extra to cover their increased local currency costs. In 1995, visitor arrivals fell by 20% to the lowest figure since 1988. In consequence, tourism earnings fell by a quarter.

As intended, liberalisation led to higher trade volumes. In 1994, exports ( + 16%) rose by more than imports ( + 13%) in value terms, but the position was reversed in 1995 when the latter jumped by 35% while the former were 14% lower. One good sign was that the highest import growth was in industrial supplies and machinery (60% up) but the fact that the deficit almost doubled to reach record levels was obviously a cause for concern.

A major revolution has also taken place in trade flows. In 1994, for the first time, Uganda overtook the UK as the biggest importer of Kenyan goods. In the same year, the value of Kenya's exports to African countries moved ahead of its combined exports to Europe and North America.

During 1994, the Nairobi Stock Exchange proved to be one of the worid's best-performing stock markets, the value of shares rising by 80%.1995 was disappointing, however. Although foreigners were allowed to invest for the first time, the index nonetheless fell by 25%.

Fighting inflation has been the CBK's main objective since 1993 and a tight monetary policy has brought the problem under control. Inflation dropped from 46% in 1993 to 29% in 1994 and to below 2% in 1995. Recently, however, an upward trend has bean observed. This follows a money supply increase far in excess of the expansion of economic activity, and is mainly due to a substitution of treasury bills for borrowing from the Central Bank since the end of 1994. If inflation is to remain within the 5% target for 1996-which already seemed highly unlikely by the middle of the year - the trend needs to be speedily reversed.

Initially, the main way of mopping up excess liquidity was through the sale of treasury bills. When the sales began in March 1993, there was a huge liquidity overhang and high interest rates had to be offered to take money out of the market quickly. The rate earned on 90-day bills-which became the lead interest rate in the economy- rose from 17% to 80% between March and July 1993. It then declined steadily, reaching 18% at the end of 1994. This prompted an outflow of short-term capital, leading to currency depreciation and lower foreign reserves. Since mid 1995, treasury bill rates have been back above 20% and this seems to have stabilised the foreign exchange situation. It is generally believed that the high prevailing real interest rates are a major obstacle to investment and economic growth.

Interest on domestic debt is still a big item in the state budget, although, the situation is much improved, thanks to the reduction in the stock of treasury bills and lower interest rates. In fiscal year 1993/94, interest payments on domestic debt alone swallowed one third of total gavernnnent expenditure.

The agriculture sector employs 70% of the total labour force and generates more than a quarter of Kenya's GDP. Much of industry is linked to agricultural processing, and tea, coffee and horticultural products are Kenya's major foreign exchange earners after tourism. The marketing of key farm products is dominated by large parastatals and cooperatives which are often run like parastatals. Most marketing organisations have been hard hit by the liberalisation, which brought both inefficiency and corruption to light. Tea growers have complained about improprieties at the Kenya Tea Development Authority. Imported sugar flooded the local market, often without paying import duties, leaving the mills with huge stocks. This, in turn, created severe cash flow problems. Most sugar farmers have not been paid for months. Kenya Cooperative Creameries was not able to pay farmers for milk deliveries for up to half a year, and could only start servicing the arrears when the Government came to its rescue with KSh 800 million in January 1996.

Formidable challenges

Kenya's labour force, around 12.5 million in 1996, is growing at more than 4% a year. This means that at least half a million people enter the job market annually. The challenge of absorbing the new workers is formidable. Studies show that any strategy to deal with this must be based on three pillars: smallholder agriculture (to absorb most of the growth in the rural labour force), continuing substantial job creation in the informal sector, and high real GDP growth (+8% per year is needed to ensure that the modem sector absorbs a significant number of workers).

Informal sector employment has risen rapidly (up by 15-20% a year since 1991). By 1994, for the first time, there were more people working here than in the modern economy. The informal sector covers semi-organised and unregulated activities largely under taken by self-employed people or employers with just a few workers. Typically, they do not comply fully with tax, registration, and licensing rules, and this sometimes leads to conflict with the authorities. Workers are often paid below the minimum wage and have no social security. For many, the informal sector is, therefore, an 'employer' of last resort.

It is estimated that almost 50% of rural people and 30% of urban residents live in absolute poverty- unable to meet their minimum requirements for food and essential non-food items. While the percentage has remained fairly stable in recent decades, the increase in the number of 'absolute' poor is alarming. So too is the extent of the poverty: the gap between these people's minimum needs and their actual disposable income has reportedly increased over the last ten years. The bulk of the poor live in the central and western parts of the country, which have the best agricultural potential, the rich soils having always attracted settlers. For decades there was enough land to go around, but demographic trends have finally started to take their toll. The size of landholding has declined continuously, in many cases reaching levels which are no longer capable of sustaining a family.

There has been some progress in restructuring parastatals, but much remains to be done. The performance of key parastatals has been unsatisfactory by international standards and this has constrained growth. At Mombasa port, which is managed by the Kenya Ports Authority, handling charges are 50% higher than the global average, while container turnover is three times slower. Rail transport is unreliable, slow and more expensive than road haulage. The Kenya Power and Lighting Company has a shortage of generating capacity which means periodic power cuts. And intervention in the maize market by the National Cereals and Produce Board- at above-market prices-has prevented private sector involvement as well as placing a heavy burden on government finances. The Board has posted annual operating losses of between KSh 1.8bn and KSh 2.5bn each fiscal year since 1992/93.

Corruption, misuse of funds, and the politics of patronage remain endemic and these clearly distort development. Elimination of corruption has been an aim of most reform programmes but it seems that the effect so far has only been to change its form. Trade liberalisation has killed cash cows such as import and foreign exchange licences, and the commercialisation of parastatals has stopped them from doing deals with cronies which were profitable only for the latter. But other forms of non-acceptable wealth accumulation have emerged. In the early 1990s, alleged exports of gold and diamonds are thought to have resulted in a loss of KSh 7 billion of public funds. Land grabbing has also become widespread. This either involves land being sold to individuals or companies with well-established political connections at well below market prices, or the purchase of land by public institutions from the same individuals or companies at inflated prices.

After delays because of political differences, cooperation between the three states of the former East African Community (Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya) was revived in early 1996. The EAC Secretariat, based in Arusha, is headed by a Kenyan, Francis Muthaura, a former ambassador in Brussels. For the three countries, the new cooperation aims at facilitating movements of people, capital and trade within the region, and harmonisation of external tariffs and investment regulations. Currencies will be fully convertible. This revived cooperation is expected to have a major growth impact. The Nairobi Stock Exchange is currently assisting Kampala and Dar es Salaam to set up their own exchanges. And the NSE Chairman, Jimnah Mbaru, sees the future not only in a cross-listing of companies in the three places, but in a regional stock exchange.

Policy framework

The Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for 1996-1998, which was published in February ahead of the donors' Consultative Group (CG) Meeting, was highly applauded for both its content and form. The programme, which the media has dubbed 'the big push', promises finally to crack most of the 'hard nuts' of previous reform agendas, in particular in the parastatal and public sector. It also lays down measures aimed at supporting fiscal and monetary discipline through the next elections. These include cutting the budget deficit to 1.5 % of GDP by 1997/98, a tight monetary policy, and more autonomy for the Central Bank. In addition, it tackles some areas'that have emerged as avenues of corruption in recent years, such as the National Social Security Fund. While previous PFPs were highly confidential, this one was published, and the President appointed a Commission chaired by himself to oversee its implementation. These are seen as important steps in bridging the credibility gap which threatened to open up again in 1995. Donors are prepared to support the reform agenda and are eager to see it implemented speedily. Shortly after the positive outcome of the CG meeting, the IMF approved a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility programme for a total of $220m. The World Bank is expected to follow suit with a credit of $85m.

An increasing number of donors, however, have pointed to the link between democratic governance/ human rights issues on the one hand, and aid and investment flows on the other. If Kenya is to meet its ambitious targets and turn into a newly-industrialising country by 2010, foreign inflows will be vital. The point was succinctly put by a delegate to the CG meeting. 'If its (the Government's) economic successes are matched by a commitment to democracy and human rights, Kenya may yet prove that surging economic growth is not just for Asian tigers, but for African lions, too.' The period leading up to the next general election will be the acid test.

E.P.

Some countries have a strong folk memory. Despite its size, Mali appears hemmed in by its frontiers. For more than a thousand years, this state was a splendid empire, constantly spreading outward and reflecting the history of the African continent with its conquests and alliances, reversals of fortune and moments of glory. At its height, it extended from the Atlantic to the Sudanese border, from the south of Morocco to the north of Nigeria. Mali's history rests in the minds of its people rather than in any structures inherited from the past. This acts as an antidote to the 'amnesia' often brought on by colonisation, which has the effect of paralysing the future. Although poor, the country has a well-established sense of its place in the world.

A racial melting pot

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On the eve of colonisation, Mali was known es 'west Sudan'. In 1924, the territory then known as 'French Sudan' was split up and small portions of the Malian nation were incorporated into the seven states bordering it-a move certainly not calculated to have a cohesive effect on the remnants of the old empire. Mali has long been a melting pot of races, ethnic groups and cultures. They have learned to live together- intermingling, sometimes forming unexpected alliances, and occasionally fighting one another. The result today is a potpourri where true racial or ethnic confrontation is difficult to imagine. The interplay of history and the mixing of ethnic groups, families and individuals, has created what one intellectual de scribed to us as 'the anti Rwanda vaccine'. Historical mythology offers, perhaps, further evidence of the fusion of cultures in this country. As in ancient Greece or Rome, to take European examples, each ethnic group and each Malian empire, was 'backed' by a host of gods, spirits and totems. In this nebulous world, where dreams beget history and where vastly differing ethnic groups can trace themselves back to a common ancestor, the result was a multiplicity of interrelationships. Under various names, the python totem belongs to many different peoples, including the Peal, Ma/inke and Sarakolle. A study of the migrations of the peoples who make up Mali also reveals a great many relationships - for example, between the Dogon, who are black, and the Shongoi; who are more half-caste. They regard one another as cousins, originating from Aswan in Egypt.

Malians appear to share a genuine sense of belonging in keeping with their shared culture. The 'people' of Mali came into being long before the state of the same name. The guerilla war fought in recent years by the Tuaregs (this is the English plural, Tuareg already being the plural form of Targul) against the Malian army, is often viewed abroad as a struggle between whites (or Arabs) and blacks. But this is an illusion. Although the Tuaregs are probably the only 'white' minority in the country, they are an integral ingredient in the melting pot. They are also known as 'Kel-Tamasheq' - those who speak Tamashek, which was originally the language of their Bella slaves. Like all the country's ethnic groups, they have dominated and have in turn been dominated. They have forged alliances with one another, and, more commonly, have united against Arab or Berber invasions. The relative absence of bitterness overall is probably due to the fact that each of Mali's peoples has had its era of glory and imperial dominance.

Mali is lucky to have such knowledge of its history. For centuries, the most precise details have been collected by the griots. The same role has also been played by the many secret societies which have initiation periods lasting, in some cases, up to 50 years. They were, and sometimes still are, repositories for the secrets of history, magic, astrology and science, and also for the symbols of power-the religious objects and artefacts of the former emperors. There are written sources as well, something which is quite rare in Africa. These have been transcribed since the beginning of the millennium and, in recent decades, close collaboration between historians, griots and members of traditional societies has enabled a deeper knowledge to be gained of Mali's history.

A rich empire

Asselar Man, discovered near Timbuktu in the centre of Mali, was a contemporary of Cro Magnon Man.

Cave paintings from five thousand B.C. reveal similarities with those in Egypt and are probably the work of migrant populations from the east, who moved into Mali as the Sahara Desert expanded. Less reliable sources state that interbred populations of Jews and Egyptians under the command of an officer of the Pharaoh Dinga created the Soninke dynasty (originating from Aswan). These people probably laid the found ations of the first great Malian empire, that of Ouagadou. Other sources, equally unreliable, report that they were probably Judaeo-Syrians who arrived at the end of the third century A.D. and found a population already in place. What is more or less certain is that, during the first millennium, a Soninke dynasty was installed around the current frontier between Mauritania and Mali and that 40 princes ruled it in succession in the period prior to 750 A.D. Initially, these rulers were white but, with increasing intermarriage, their skins became darker and darker. To Arab chroniclers, Mali came to be known as Bafour or Bilad es-Soudan (the country of the blacks). At the beginning of the second millennium, the Ouagadou empire held sway over several kingdoms in the south, including the Nigerian delta and a number of Berber principalities. Documents dating from this period have replaced the name Ouagadou with that of Ghana, by analogy, perhaps, with the emperor's title. The empire was already very rich, the richest in the world according to an Arab chronicler who visited it in 970. A work by the writer A/ Bakri, which appeared a century later (1087) went into great detail about the empire's organisation-the system of matrilinear succession, the role of councils of dignitaries, and the capital, Koumbi (whose foundations were discovered in 1914 in southern Mauritania). This city was divided into two districts, one of these being the sacred, imperial city, home to the empire's python totem to which a young girl was sacrificed every year.

A story of courage

The killing of the snake totem is the most significant myths in the country's history. The hero of the story is Amadou Sefedokete whose love for his beautiful fiancee Sia (who was about to be offered in sacrifice), prompted him to descend into the monster's lair and confront it. By killing the totem, he broke the thread of countless generations before him, who had carried out the ritual sacrifice. He is still remembered for this magnificent action, based on love and a sense of nobility, and he remains a subject for artists of all types. His brave action still causes young lovers in Africa to shudder in admiration. However, this act of deicide brought about a reversal of fortunes. The monster's seven heads, which the young hero is said to have cut off one after the other, are reputed to have been scattered to the four comers of the earth, thereby dispersing the empire's riches and leaving it penniless. The true story is more prosaic. Ghana's wealth was eyed greedily by the Arabs and Berbers who had long traded with it. The empire's resistance in the face of Islam gave Moroccan religious fanatics a pretext for organising a jihad. It was invaded by an army of 30000 devotees supported by forces from some of the empire's black vassal states. The 'holy war' began in 1042 ending 34 years later with the occupation of Koumbi.

The occupation did not last long but was followed by internal clan wars which brought about the end of an era. Restoration came about at the end of the 72th century , in the small Sosso kingdom, south of Ouagadou (also set up by a small group of Soninké). One of the minor kings called Soumangourou Diarasso dreamed of recreating Ghana's empire, and, in 1203, he succeeded in sacking the ancient capital of Koumbi in a move designed to establish his own dynasty. This was an important symbolic act and in the fierce war which followed, Soumangourou subjugated Mandé, a region which was overflowing with wealth. One of Africa's greatest heroes, Soundjata, rose up against him. He was supposedly the legitimate heir to the Mandingo throne, but was unable to walk, having been born an invalid of a deformed mother who had been married at the recommendation of the king's sorcerer. His young half-brother took his place on the throne and sent the paralysed prince into exile. At the age of 18, Soundjata decided to seize his own place in history and a 'giant' was thus bom. In 1235, his army fought that of the bloodthirsty Sosso monarch whom he himself is said to have cut down in an extraordinary battle. It was a fight which, according to the legends, saw the use of all types of weapon, including magic. Soundjata had forged a grand alliance in order to gain victory. Rather than reducing to vassalage the small kingdoms which had allied themselves with him, the new emperor decided to form them into a federation-although he wisely declared that from Niani (his capital), 'I shall see all'. His empire took the name of 'Mali' (the hippopotamus) on account of that animal's strength and mastery of bath water and land. For 20 years, the empire was to stretch as far as the Atlantic Ocean. Its structure, based on a number of warrior clans, craftsmen, freemen and marabous, is still characteristic of Mali and neighbouring countries today. The empire was rich in gold once again but also in terms of agricultural organisation with the development of cotton and groundout farming. Soundjata disappeared mysteriously in 1255, leaving a prosperous empire.

'Conquest' of America?

In 1285, there was a struggle for succession between two princes and a third, Prince Sakoura (a freed slave), took advantage of the quarrel to take power for himself. Sakoura expanded the empire by subjugating the Timbuktu Tuaregs and the Gao Shongoi: After his short reign, a genuine heir of Soundjata, Aboubakar II, ascended the throne. He had his eye on conquests over the seas and, according to the story, he set sail westwards leading a fleet of 2000 vessels. He was never seen again. However, recent studies favour the hypothesis that he was not lost at sea as had always been supposed' but did, in fact, reach the Americas. A series of ineffective monarchs succeeded this 'conqueror of the impossible', who preceded Christopher Columbus by 200 years, leaving little real impression on history other than the records of their exuberant behaviour. One of them, for example, went on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 with a reported retinue of 60 000 and distributed considerable amounts of gold to all the dignitaries he encountered in that holy place. These kings, however, are acknowledged as having preserved the empire's unity, guaranteeing order without repression and allowing wide religious, moral and sexual tolerance, even for married women.

The kingdom centred on Gao dates back to at least the first millennium but it was usually a vassal of the Ouagadou empire and of Mali. One of its kings, Sonny Ali Ber (known as Sonny the Great), came to the throne in 1464, profiting from the decay of the Mali empire. His reign was marked by a bitter struggle against the Ulémas of Timbuktu who, over a period of four centuries following the Almoravid conquest, had converted a large portion of the empire to Islam. The circumstances of Sonny's disappearance are uncertain, but he is thought to have drowned in 1492, the year when a certain Genoese navigator was to achieve the ancient goal of 'discovering' the Malian empire.

Sonny Ber's successor did not last long in the face of Islamic expansion. The new Askia dynasty was installed to lead the Shongoi empire, and this expanded with the annexation of Dahomey and part of Nigeria. However, a small part of the former Mali empire never passed under their rule. The Askia dynasty blew hot and cold in terms of religious fervour. Tyrannical at first, it later took a softer line. Under the reign of one monarch, the Gao court based in the university city of Timbuktu became a place of exceptional refinement-only to slide once again into a state of intolerance. One of the Askias, having destroyed the last symbols of the former Mali empire, the city of Niani, set upon his former Moroccan allies. Another emperor, Askia Daoud (1549-1582), turned out to be a fine administrator. He developed agriculture and set up a genuine bank in Gaol War with Morocco continued throughout his reign and beyond. In 1584, imperial force defeated 20 000 Moroccan soldiers, winning a victory which might have been decisive had it not been for internal dissent. This weakened the Askia side and enabled Morocco, with a band of Spanish mercenaries, to take over the empire, following a battle in April 1591. Success was due, above all on this occasion, to the firearms deployed by the winning side. Such weapons were unknown to the 45 000 Malian cavalry and infantry who were engaged. It also turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. The occupying troops sent the great scholars from Timbuktu University to Morocco, where their peers took up their cause. Moreover, the foreign soldiers were won over by the easy life in Mali-and one of the first results of their presence was a big increase in the half-caste population. In 1612, the troops rejected the Moroccan command: the occupation was at an end and the last few Moroccans were later expelled from Timbuktu by the Tuaregs.

Black religious proselytism and colonisation

To each dog his day. In the 17th century, the Bambaras set up an empire around Segou, but the debauched lifestyle of several of the sovereigns and disapproval of the part they played in the slave trade proved to be their downfall. Once again, the history of the country was to be shaped by a slave- Ngolo Diarra-who founded his dynasty in 1766. He was able to restore a degree of prestige to the kingdom, but his efforts were undermined after his death. As a reaction, a proselytising Black Islam then began to evolve.

Massina became a theocratic state around the beginning of the 19th century, in common with other kingdoms which appeared at the same time. One of their most famous rulers, the conqueror El Hadj Oumar, was defeated by the troops of the French General Faidherbe who forced him to give up West Senegal. The days of Malian independence were now numbered. The courage of his successor only delayed the progress of French colonisation, which finally prevailed at the end of the century.

Resistance fighters carried on the war from other points in the old empire, particularly from what is now Guinea. The country was dismantled by the colonial system and pacified, but the end of the Second World War and the return of African soldiers brought a renewed desire for independence. French Sudan became the rallying point for freedom fighters in the French colonies-the old dream of reunification was not dead and buried. In 1946, the Rassemblement Democratique Africain was set up, later to become the USRDA (Union soudanaise-Rassemblement democratique africain). In 1956, the future architect of Mali's independence, Modibo Keita, was appointed leader of the movement and elected to represent the 'Sudan' in the French Assembly. A 'Malian Federation' project was drawn up to include Dahomey (Benin), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Senegal and 'Sudan' (Mali). A constituent assembly of independence movement representatives was set up in 1959. However, the constitution adopted by the local Malian and Senegalese assemblies was rejected by the other two. The Federation now had only two members but was nonetheless proclaimed independent on 20 June 1960. In the event, the spirit of unity was lacking and, on the pretext of a rivalry between the two leaders (the 'Sudanese' Modibo Keita and the Senegalese Mamadou Dia), Senegal withdrew from the union in August. On 22 September 1960, the 'Sudan', now without an outlet to the sea, adopted one of the most prestigious names in its history: Mali.

The new state was landlocked not only geographically but also, very soon, politically. Modibo Keita's socialist agenda prompted foreign investors to pull out, and the country was organised increasingly as a 'people's democracy'. Fortunately, the repression was not excessive but a sizeable proportion of the population disapproved of the system that had been chosen. Mali and Guinea still had modest aspirations to their old dream of unification. The founder of the Republic, Modibo Keita, was overthrown by a military coup on 19 November 1968. More than the break-up by colonisation, which left dreams of Sudan being reconstituted, this military putsch sounded the knell of the old empire. Mali became just another state whose colonial and post-colonial eras have been marked by a lack of success. Nevertheless, a sense of history is still omnipresent.

Hegel Goueier

(Dossier coordinated by Augustine Oyowe)

Previous editions of The Courier have dealt, separately and at length, with various aspects of human resource development, especially in the context of recent dossiers on population and social development, education and training, public health, women, and poverty. Our current dossier looks at the issue from the investment perspective.

To say that investing in people makes economic sense is to state the obvious. But to what extent are the implications of this statement fully understood in the developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa in these days of constantly shifting development theories?

Labour or 'human capital' has long been recognised as a key factor of economic growth. As opposed to sustainable human development, which places human beings at the centre of economic activities (the recipient of the fruits of economic progess), 'human capital' places them at the beginning of the process. The difference of approach is thus evident even though the objective is the same.

Investing in people is a concept which simultaneously combines 'human welfare' with the 'human capital' approach at the beginning of the economic development process. It encompasses nutrition, health and education, and should, under the right investment climate or conditions, enable any investor, whether State or individual, to reap an adequate return .

After three decades of considerable efforts at investment in health and education by sub-Saharan African countries, the returns in terms of standards of living, economic grovvth and rate of development have been extremely disappointing. The conclusion which can be drawn is that the conditions necessary for adequate returns on these investments have been absent.

Colonial legacy

Sub-Saharan Africa inherited from the colonial regimes, infrastructures in health delivery and education that were not only alien to its culture and traditions, but also totally inadequate for nation building. It is a well known fact that in 1960, there were no more than 1200 university graduates in Capital redefined

It is important when thinking of investnent in human resources to understand the real concept of capital. Below is an extract of a definition given by Stefan de Vylder (taken from his UNDP discussion paper: 'Sustainable Human Development and Macroeconomics strategic links and implications' .

A child in the North is born wealthy. His or her share of the capital accumulated by earlier generations is worth a fortune. The higher wages and salaries in the North, compared with those in the South, largely reflect differences in endowment of the country, rather than of the individual. The fact that, for example, a nurse in Germany earns 30 times more than one in Bangladesh or Zambia has little to do with individual differences in training or skills; the higher salaries in the North simply reflect the higher dividend on the capital bestowed from the past. Part of this wealth or heritage is easily visible: factories, roads, schools hospitals, universities, telecommunications, and other infrastructure.

However, there are other, less tangible, forms of capital that constitute a crucial complement to physical and infrastructural capital; parliamentary democracy, a free press, respect for human rights' norms for social interaction, systems of rapid dissemination of new ideas, trade unions and a myriad of other large or small social organisations, a judiciary system which, by and large, defends law and justice, and other institutions. This latter form of capital may be called institutional or social capital. It is also highly unevenly distributed in the world, with large differences both between the North and the South and within individual countries of the North as well as in the South the region as a whole. Indeed, some countries had no graduates at all and in others, they could be counted on the fingers of one hand. In what was effectively a race against time, African leaders understandably responded by investing massively in human resource development. This was made possible partly by small, but steady rates of economic growth and partly by sustained foreign assistance. Between 1960 and 1980, sub-Saharan African governments consistently allocated high proportions of their annual budgets to health and education. Households and individuals made similar efforts (accounting for nearly 75% of all spending on health). They made sacrifices and gave a high premium to the education of their children.

The results were tangible and very significant. By the late 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa was producing over 70 000 graduates a year. Major cities had hospitals and health centres and the rural areas, clinics and dispensaries. Amid a general improvement in nutrition and health-care delivery, the incidence of infectious disease, and maternal and infant mortality were considerably reduced.

Despite these achievements, the approach to manpower building by the post-independent African leaders was, to say the least, haphazard. As a result, a number of problems, such as the appropriateness of school curricula, under staffing and the long-term budget implications of recurrent expenditures, were overlooked (although reform efforts have since been attempted in some countries with varying degrees of success).

The consequences were felt in the 1980s when Africa's economic crisis was only just beginning. Health and school infrastructures deteriorated for lack of maintenance. There were shortages of qualified teachers and teaching materials leading to falls in educational standards as well as in primary school enrolments. And health systems failed for lack of personnel and drugs.

The situation has worsened as the continent's economic crisis has deepened-a crisis characterised by huge budget deficits, high inflation rates, sluggish growth rates and a heavy debt burden. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), introduced in response to this, have only served to undermine further the gains made in human resource development. SAPs have been aimed mainly at macroeconomic stabilisation, deregulation and privatisation of state enterprises, and the social sectors have lost out in the process. Subsidies on basic commodities, especially food, have been removed, civil servants and employees of state enterprises have been made redundant and cost-recovery has become the standard practice in medical services. These measures have all combined to produce a level of poverty never before seen in the region, a situation which has adversely affected nutritional standards, provoked malnutrition in many countries and reduced resistance generally to infectious diseases. Because of the rise in unemployment, large sections of the educated population have been rendered unproductive, a waste of several years investment by both the state and the individuals in question.

Appropriateness of skills

Although sub-Saharan Africa produced a large number of graduates before the economic crisis began, few had the kinds of skills needed for industry and agriculture. The evidence of this lies in the unsuccessful attempts by some governments in the late 1970s to indigenise executive positions, most of which required high levels of technological knowledge or experience. The 1980s saw a dramatic increase in the number of foreign technical assistants working on the continent and, paradoxically, in the number of qualified African professionals leaving, mainly for Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

International technical assistance to, or cooperation with, subSaharan Africa has intensified. Organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNESCO, European Union and Commonwealth are all involved in one form or another. The effectiveness of this assistance varies, however. This dossier features articles on the work of three of these bodies (the Commonwealth, UNDP and VNESCO). The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation was set up more than 25 years ago to mobilise Commonwealth skills to meet the needs of member states as required. The UNDP's TOKTEN programme is designed to reduce the negative impact of the brain drain by getting highly qualified developing country expatriates to contribute their skills to the development of their home countries without necessarily having to return permanently. Finally, UNESCO's university twinning programme is designed as a mechanism for the rapid transfer of technology and sharing of knowledge.

While international assistance or cooperation is indispensable, it is surely no substitute for Africa's own efforts at human resource development. Three years ago, Edward Jaycox, then World Bank Vice-President for the Africa Region, announced what appeared to be a change of policy at the annual conference of the African-American Institute in Washington DC. He said that the Bank would no longer pay for foreign technical assistants to help resolve African economic problems but would instead help African governments build their own capacity. Although the Bank has traditionally had enormous influence on development thinking and policy worldwide, the apparent policy change does not appear to have influenced other donors. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that the Bank itself is implementing it vigorously. The number of foreign experts being sent to Africa continues to grow. There were over 100 000 in 1988.

Rationality of investing in people

In addition to the negative social impact, ten years of structural adjustment have not produced the sought-after stabilisation or the economic growth that was initally anticipated. Even the World Bank and IMF, who spearheaded the structural adjustment idea, have admitted that it has flaws and the need for a new approach to sub-Saharan Africa's economic problems could hardly be more urgent. In the Dossier, Giovanni Andreas Cornia argues for a new focus for structural adjustment, based on restoring adequate levels of public spending on health, education, social welfare and water supplies, so as to enable sub-Saharan Africa to restore and develop its human resources.

Evidence of the impact of a healthy and educated population on economic growth and development abound. Studies on the economies of the East Asian 'tigers' have all concluded that big investments in education in the late 1950s and 1960s were largely responsible for the rapid growth they have experienced in recent years. Malaysia, although a latecomer, appears to be following in the footsteps of its neighbours. After nearly two decades of investment in human resource development, and the introduction of a foreign investment policy which requires some technology transfer, the Government now predicts Malaysia will achieve 'fully developed' status by 2016-twenty years from now.

A relatively well-educated workforce and a certain amount of physical capital or natural resources are all a country needs to succeed economically. Sub-Saharan Africa has sufficient natural resources as is often pointed out. The other side of the equation-a relatively well-educated workforce-is missing.

Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind other regions in human resource development for a complex variety of reasons. The natural and political environment are not conducive to the delivery of social services: low population density and weak transport infrastructures make such delivery expensive and the achievement of economies of scale impossible. The region's climate favours a variety of diseases (such as malaria and sleeping sickness) and many areas have little or no access to natural water sources. Political instability and weak institutions also continue to cast a long shadow. Although these constraints are long-term, appropriate policy measures could reduce their negative impact significantly.

Giovanni Cornia analyses the distributive effects of appropriate health care, nutrition and education on economic growth. He suggests ways of making rational use of available resources for maximum returns and of mobilising funds through taxation, foreign aid and other sources.

In an age of increasing globalisation, where technology is more easily transferable across borders, a healthy and educated population is essential, not only for the absorption and use of new technology but also for meaningful participation in international trade.

It is insufficient, however, to have an educated workforce. Sub Saharan Africa must acquire the institutional and managerial capacity to make the right decisions, both in the public and private sectors. This is essential in the quest to eliminate poverty, achieve sustained and sustainable economic growth and ensure a realistic integration of the region into the global economy.

by Giovanni Andrea Cornia

Over the past two decades, a clear consensus, supported by a growing amount of empirical evidence, has emerged on the growth and distributive effects of appropriate health care, nutrition and education, and on the rationality of investing in human resources to promote development in low-income economies, and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. It is now clear that public and private rates of return on investment in primary and secondary education are substantially greater than those in most industrial sectors. Similarly, it is now well demonstrated that nutritional interventions in favour of workers at low levels of food intake has a very large impact on labour productivity. Also, provision of simple but adequate nutrition and health care at an early age has been shown to spare substantially greater health outlays over the longer term. While the number of these examples can be multiplied, the lesson is overwhelmingly clear: investing in people is a sound development policy.

During the same two decades, a broad political consensus has also emerged on the need to establish realistic targets in these areas and mobilise adequate resources to achieve them. The latter decade, however, has also been characterised by a widespread and acute recession which has reached its lowest point in the African continent.

While there has been a general recognition of the link between the deterioration of the social sector and Africa's economic decline, the interpretations of the causes of this decline and how best to address them vary considerably.

The 1980s also witnessed the advent of structural adjustment, an approach aiming at revitalising economies affected by severe crises and which calls, amongst other things, for a reduction in public spending, including on social services. With sharp falls in revenues, it was argued, African governments could no longer afford to provide health and education free of charge.

Governments were to encourage instead the role of the private sector (since competition between state, private and non-governmental agencies fosters efficiency and enhances quality) and make households bear a greater share of the cost of publicly provided social services (as-it was alleged-households had a strong 'willingness to pay' for better quality health care and education).

In a debate characterised by an overwhelming concern for expenditure reduction, little thought was given to protecting the provision and effectiveness of basic health care and education for all. Nor was sufficient attention paid to the mobilisation of additional revenue through taxation, foreign aid or other measures Even the introduction of rationalisation measures, which would have allowed for use and preservation of limited resources, received scant attention. During this period, public policies often ignored a number of well-known public finance arguments concerning market failures, externalities, natural monopolies, etc. typical of basic health and education. It was all too often forgotten, for instance, that the market systematically undersupplies 'quasi-public goods' like education, safe water, immunisation and collective infrastructure (i.e. goods which produce benefits not only for consumers but also for society as a whole); that incomplete or non-existent markets alone are unable to provide complete insurance coverage against the risks of sickness and disability; that the free play of market forces can generate levels of poverty that are socially unacceptable, and that competition among many small providers does not allow for the realisation of the economies of scale which only the public sector can realise because of its size, administrative infrastructure and revenue raising ability.

Greater and better government involvement

In this paper, I will attempt to point out the main distortions in the social sector in sub-Saharan Africa and the major reforms, part of an alternative policy paradigm to the standard approach focusing on large expenditure reductions. My main line of argument is for more efficient and renewed but, in most cases, greater rather than less government involvement. I do not deny the important role of communities, nongovernmental bodies and private providers of social services, but the retreat of the state, which has been underway for several years in most of Africa, is palpably wrong: it may be a good survival strategy, it is definitely not a good development strategy.

Any approach to revitalisation of the social sector in Africa must aim at increasing both the quality and the relevance of services to the life, health and productivity of the population; enhancing efficiency; reducing distributive biases in the use of public expenditure, and improving the flow of both public and private resources to the social sector. These sets of measures are briefly discussed here.

Raising relevance, reducing unit costs and enhancing quality

Two basic initiatives are essential to the achievement of this goal. Firstly, it is necessary to adapt the content of services to the demands placed on the child, the adolescent and the family by the external environment. Secondly, in doing so, it is necessary to provide minimum resources, particularly recurrent inputs, for every unit of service offered.

Much can be done to improve the relevance of education in Africa. A key element in this is the wider use of African languages in the educational system. Admittedly such a step would probably encounter obstacles, but the results of pilot projects in the continent and experiences in several English speaking countries have been encouraging. The use of African languages should be expanded throughout primary and at least part of secondary schooling. And the curriculum of basic education should include basic health science, agriculture, food and nutrition, basic technological science, ecology and environmental studies as well as reading, writing, arithmetic, history, geography and elementary civics.

While responding more appropriately to the life and developmental needs of children and adolescents, these measures offer the potential to improve substantially the cost effectiveness of the educational system by reducing the number of drop-outs and repeaters, particularly if the measures are accompanied by school-based nutritional support programmes and by steps to ensure a steady, if basic, supply of teaching materials such as books, chalk, slates, pens, exercise books and so on. Minimum expenditures for the latter, estimated at $5-10 per child per year, have been shown to have a profound impact on the quality and attractiveness of education.

Improving the relevance and quality of African secondary and higher education will require an increase in the number of courses in science, engineering, agronomy, management and other fields. Given the limited success of vocational training and yet the profound need for this type of education, a more flexible approach may be appropriate. Business associations and ministries of labour, rather than ministries of education, for example, could organise the type of vocational training that responds more closely to labour market conditions. Much needs to be done to gear university research to local and national needs. Rather than maintaining the model of independent residential universities, faculties could interact more with and rely upon local institutions and non-governmental organisations.

In the health sector, a more vigorous approach is necessary to implement the 'Health for All' strategy. In particular, more attention must be paid to the quality of the training imparted to village health workers, the provision of minimum supplies of essential drugs, adequate supervision, the mobilisation of communities and the strengthening of family planning services in the first tier of the primary health care pyramid.

Greater efforts are needed to contain unit costs through the mobilisation of community resources (such as materials and time) and the introduction of 'product standards' and 'production techniques' more in line with local factor endowments. With respect to capital expenditure, one major source of potential savings is the substitution of imported materials with local ones in the construction of schools, clinics and other public health facilities. Through this approach, capital costs per student could be more than halved.

In health care, savings are also possible, in some cases, in wages and other recurrent expenditures. The potential for savings through increased efficiency in the procurement, management, storage, distribution and prescription of pharmaceuticals is substantial.

And there is a need for more carefully articulated manpower policies, with recognition of the cost implications of alternative skill mixes. Many tasks carried out by senior professionals can be performed by auxiliary personnel. In this regard, there is substantial scope for the application of nominal fees as a tool to guide demand for health care and thus increase efficiency.

Similar considerations are valid in the education sector. Despite considerable declines during the 1980s in both French-speaking and Eastern and Southern Africa, teacher salaries in the late 1980s were still considerably higher than per capita GNP in several countries. While a cutback may be possible in some countries, reductions below the 'efficiency wage' should be avoided as they affect the quality of teaching.

There are, of course, other approaches to reducing unit costs such as using teachers trained on crash courses and- paid salaries lower than that of fully trained ones, multi shift education to increase teaching hours, multigrade classes to increase class sizes and the creation of regional training centres with donor support. In addition, in most of sub-Saharan Africa, all university students receive fellowships to cover living expenses while at school. In many cases these fellowships represent a substantial proportion of total unit costs at the tertiary level. They add, in effect, to the regressive nature of educational subsidies and should be suppressed for all except for those who are least able to pay.

Improving distribution

Substantial improvements in the distribution of benefits of public expenditure could be obtained through its restructuring towards basic services which benefit the poor more than they do the rich. This would mean, typically, the reallocation of part of the expenditure on hospitals to primary health care activities and part of the expenditure on universities to primary education. It would also mean that a greater share of investments in water supply and sanitation should be assigned to rural areas.

Correcting existing misallocation, however, is not simple, as capital and labour resources are only partially mobile. This is particularly true of capital expenditure which has already been invested in physical infrastructure. Inter sect oral reallocation is easier for recurrent expenditure, particularly when budgets are expanding, and it can lead to the achievement of more efficient and distributive gains.

Government subsidies need to be improved through effective targeting on 'merit goods' (such as food and shelter). Targeting is distributionally and administratively more effective when it is accomplished according to some objective criteria such as geography (the poorest areas), type of commodity ( low quality foods not consumed by the rich), easily identifiable population group (like pregnant women, young children, children in elementary school in poor areas, etc.) or season. It is less effective when carried out by means-testing or by targeting individuals.

The decentralisation of health care and education in the African context is likely to improve the geographical distribution of services. Poor communications and transport systems, population dispersion and the fact that the supervision of personnel, resource distribution and operations is easier at lower levels of administration, are all arguments in favour of such decentralisation. Nonetheless, where it means loss of control over the implementation of national policies (in curriculum development, manpower training, drug procurement and so forth) and excessive additional financial burdens on households and communities, decentralisation is potentially damaging. This was the experience of Kenya when the purchase of drugs was decentralised at the district level. It subsequently had to reverse this policy because of the problems.

Increasing the flow of resources to basic social services.

Despite the considerable scope for protecting and, in some cases, expanding the delivery of cost-effective and high-impact social services, even during periods of declining resources, there are limits to what can be achieved through the measures discussed above, particularly in countries where the share in GDP of public health and education expenditure is already low. Indeed in most African countries, the flow of resources to these sectors must be vastly increased. The options available include:

-Increasing the share of government expenditure on key social services.

Top priority should be given to a radical restructuring of government expenditure involving the shifting of resources towards those sectors with high social rates of return. Expenditure on defence can be cut substantially, while subsidies to chronically lossmaking public and private enterprises and interest payments on debt (the relief effect on foreign-debt interest payments of current provisions is utterly inadequate) should be reduced. If realistic expenditure restructuring like that proposed here were implemented, 1015% of overall public spending in many countries could be redirected to social activities with high rates of return. One half to two-thirds of these savings could be allocated to health care, nutrition, training, education and welfare, thus raising the share of these activities to about 30-35% of total expenditure.

-Increasing taxation.

Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the average tax to GDP ratio for sub-Saharan Africa fell from 18% to 16-17%. (Only recently are there signs of recovery, but these are confined to only a few countries). This resulted mainly from the recession affecting the region and from the limited priority attached to revenue collection in most adjustment programmes implemented during the first part of the 1980s. In these 'first generation' programmes, the stabilisation of deficits was achieved mainly by cutting expenditure and raising excise duties. Increases in income taxes and progressive indirect taxes were far less frequent and land and property taxes were almost never introduced.

While taking effect rapidly, the measures implemented led to excessive drops in public expenditure on 'quasi public goods' and have had a regressive distributive impact. It is now widely recognised that a more active tax policy is needed. Such a policy should aim at improving revenue generation and enhancing the efficiency and equity of the overall tax system. This would permit a controlled rise in specific 'socially efficient' public expenditures, particularly basic health, primary and secondary education and public infrastructure.

In the 1980s, a number of countries, including Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe, initiated efforts to reform their tax systems. While the choice of optimal tax instruments has depended on specific country conditions, a few general principles of tax reform apply to all countries. First, colonial type tax systems emphasising the taxation of exports (and to some extent, of imports) should evolve towards systems which focus on income taxes, progressive and efficient indirect taxes and increases in the prices of such public utilities as telephone and electricity which benefit mainly the wealthier sections of society. Second, purchases of goods and services consumed by the poorest should be exempted from indirect taxes. Third, efforts should not concentrate on raising marginal tax rates but rather on broadening the tax base by reducing tax evasion and tax elusion, and fourth a low, uniform and broad-based tax on wealth (such as on land or other assets) should be introduced.

A non-distortionary and equitably-spread increase in the tax ratio equivalent to 2-3% of GPD is technically feasible in a good number of African countries and would by itself add to the real flow of resources to health care and education by about 15%, even assuming no growth and no shift in priorities towards the social sector.

-Introducing 'earmarked' taxes or raising local ones.

The flow of tax resources to the social sector could be augmented more readily if the new tax revenue thus generated, or at least part of it, were directly earmarked for specific health and education activities (for which there are guarantees that tax money is spent efficiently), or if these taxes were raised directly by district and provincial authorities, who are usually entrusted with responsibility for social services at the local level.

-Mobilising additional resources from households and communities.

In sub-Saharan Africa, as in most other developing regions, households have long borne a substantial share of the national expenditure on health, education, water supply and so on by contributing resources (in kind, cash and time) for the construction of health and education facilities, covering direct and indirect costs (transport uniforms, fees, drugs etc.) associated with the provision of public services and making payments to private providers. Despite these already considerable contributions, user charges have been introduced or raised on a large scale in recent years in many countries to alleviate the burden on public expenditure imposed by the economic crisis.

However, while the small but significant contribution of user charges to health and education budgets should be acknowledged, the negative effects of the indiscriminate application of these charges should also be emphasised. Indeed, in many African countries the need for health care, education and other social services rarely coincides with the ability to pay. The implementation of user charges can have adverse effects in three ways. First, it may lead to a contraction in the demand for services. Second, in the health sector, it tends to discourage the use of preventive services for which potential patients may not see an immediate relevance (such as ante natal care and immunisation). Third, it may adversely affect a household's ability to meet other basic needs, such as the purchase of food, particularly if fees are charged simultaneously for health, education and other services and if the household's income declines. In addition to these problems, there is little evidence that the revenue from user charges is actually reinvested to improve the quality or expand the coverage of local services, as those who promote user charges argue. Despite recent attempts at keeping a share of the user fees at the local level (e.g. at the collecting facilities), in most cases revenue merely flows to the public treasury. Moreover, user charges usually generate a relatively small proportion of the total operating cost of the health care sector, with gross yields at around 5%. If the costs of fee collection are included, the yields are lower and, in some cases, negative.

However, health care, education and the provision of water include different types of services, some clearly geared to the needs of the poor and others catering more for middle and upper-income groups. While user charges are not well suited to primary education, disease control programmes, basic curative services and communal water supply, the same cannot be said of university education and other 'income elastic' services. For the latter, cost recovery measures would be advisable, although subsidised access for the deserving poor must be assured. For the intermediate category, which includes most curative health services and secondary education, selective cost-recovery measures might be desirable, with low income individuals exempted or charged only a nominal fee.

While direct user fees (levied on patients at the moment of their treatment) are problematic from several perspectives, there are other indirect ways to mobilise resources from communities (generally before episodes of illness), such as various kinds of prepayment schemes, health insurance, lotteries, mutual funds and the sale of produce from community fields, in addition to their contributions in kind. These schemes have two main features which are attractive for health-care: they shift the moment of payment, so that individuals are not burdened with relatively more significant expenditure at the time of illness, and they spread the burden of costs (e.g. for drugs) over a larger group.

-Increasing the volume of international aid.

There has been a considerable shift in official development assistance (ODA) in favour of Africa over the past two decades. Africa's share in total ODA rose from 19.4% in 1975/6 to 25.1% in 1980/1, and to 34.2% in 1988/9. However, the share assigned to human resource development has dropped, while- debt-service obligations have often absorbed a growing share of ODA. Greater flows are therefore needed. In the late 1980s, the World Bank estimated that additional annual aid of about $1 billion was required during the 1990s to halt social retrogression and ensure reasonable progress. But this flow of aid has not materialised on any appreciable scale. Indeed the trend in the 1990s has been towards an absolute decline in aid flows. The simplest and the most cost-effective way to effect such aid transfer would be through debt relief, although some increases in ODA are needed. Improvement in the quality of aid, including substantial shifts to programme aid, greater participation in the financing of recurrent costs and more focus on primary health care and education and on rural water supply are also required.

What role for NGOs and private providers?

While private providers, including church missions, have always been important in Africa, much of the market oriented literature tends to be very optimistic about the scope for expanding private services in order to replace government ones. Although a multiplicity of providers is desirable (and frequently unavoidable), there are several reasons why such optimism should be tempered. First, private sector services in Africa are typically concentrated in urban areas, and because of their cost, cater for upper-income groups. Although non-governmental providers (especially missions) are often located in rural areas, and they generally provide valuable services, they are seldom able to guarantee extensive coverage and in some cases may duplicate government services. Second, private providers are not without costs to governments; they often receive subsidies or preferential treatment in the allocation of foreign exchange and typically offer higher salaries and better working conditions which draw manpower away from the public sector. In Zambia, for instance, a teacher in a primary school run by the Consolidated Copper Mines can earn more than a lecturer at the University of Zambia. In countries with extremely limited numbers of doctors, certified nurses, qualified teachers and so on, greater privatisation would exacerbate the 'brain drain' from the public to the private sector and the undersupply of 'quasi public goods' for the majority, leading to harmful social differentiation. Third, quality is not necessarily an important incentive in the private sector in developing countries. The view that private institutions in health care and education are more efficient tends to be based largely on analyses in developed countries. Fourth, the growing pressure for pluralism in social service provision often gives scant attention to the problems of central coordination and planning and the development of an adequate 'regulatory framework' for private sector activities. While playing an important complementary role, the private sector and, to a lesser extent, the NGO sector, are thus affected by important objective limitations. Indeed, ironically, their proper functioning and social utility depends crucially on the existence of a stronger, not weaker, state able to regulate, coordinate and ensure that basic social services are provided - possibly through a multitude of public, NGO and private providers-to all citizens of a nation. G.A.C

by Franklyn Lisk

The development experience of much of sub-Saharan Africa in past decades provides ample illustration of the importance of capacity building in the development process. The importance is related to the ability to manage economic and social processes, including the analysis and formulation of policy options, for attaining development objectives such as employment generation and poverty reduction. The consequences of failures in domestic economic management, compounded by the effects of a prolonged economic crisis in the region have, inter alla, contributed to high and rising levels of open unemployment and underemployment, declining per Capita incomes and real wages, and an increase in the incidence and intensity of poverty in a number of African countries. The persistence of these adverse consequences, which represent a serious threat to economic growth and sustainable development, are somehow linked-either as a cause or an effect -to weaknesses and instability in the institutional framework for management and public administration.

The problem of weak institutional and general capacity for management in Africa today can be traced to the colonial legacy. This left many countries in the region, at the time of independence, with insufficient institutional and human capacity to cope with the transition from colony to independent sovereign state, particularly with respect to the responsibility for economic management. More specifically, this related to the unequal and disadvantageous manner of Africa's incorporation into the international economic system in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Lack of technological know-how, inadequate infrastructure and limited investment resources compounded the immediate post-independence problem of weak institutional capacity, and left many African countries highly vulnerable to external shocks.

It was extremely difficult for the majority of African countries to break out of the old 'protected' colonial production and trade systems and rapidly to diversify their economies in line with the requirements of participating effectively in a competitive world economy. Since independence, institutional and human capacity for management in many African countries has not grown fast enough to keep up with the requirements of changing socioeconomic circumstances at the national level and to face the challenge of increasing globalisation. Critical skill shortages in public administration and private sector management in Africa can hardly be addressed in the context of the current economic crisis. The consequences of this crisis can be seen, for example, in underfunded and poorly equipped training and management development institutions, and in low-paid and demoralised civil services. At the same time, the 'brain drain' from the continent, partly as a consequence of poor pay and career prospects, has further undermined capacity in Africa. The interaction of foreign donors and African governments has not always served the interest of capacity building. It has been admitted, even by the World Bank that 'aid has done much less than one might have hoped to reduce poverty (in Africa)'. There is now more or less a consensus in the international donor community that expatriate technical assistance does not and cannot solve all kinds of development problems in the region. Far from solving problems, the imposition of foreign technical assistance has, in some cases, become a destructive force which undermines the development of domestic capacity that is critical to solving local development problems. Where donor assistance is inappropriate in terms of project concept and design, or there is a mismatch between design and domestic implementation and management capacity, technical assistance could end up becoming part of the problem rather than the solution.

Conceptual issues

Before examining the requirements for institutional capacity building in developing countries, and particularly African countries, it is necessary to clarify salient issues pertaining to the concept. Broadly speaking, capacity building in a development context refers to a comprehensive process which includes the ability to identify constraints and to plan and manage development. The process usually involves the development of human resources and institutions, and a supportive policy environment. Ideally, it aims at improving on existing capabilities and resources and using them efficiently to achieve sustainable economic and social development.

Narrowing the concept to focus on institution-building, the emphasis will be on the development of particular institutions, their human and material resources, their organisational management and their administrative capacities. More specifically, the aim of institutional capacity building is to improve significantly the outputs and impacts of institutions concerned with economic management, public administration (including project management), enterprise development and so on-in both the public and private sectors.

It is obvious that relevant development-oriented institutions within an economy can exert a decisive influence on economic growth and employment prospects, and indeed on the attainment of sustainable economic and social development. From a macro standpoint,planning and similar development institutions are required for better management of the economy including, more crucially, the ability to mobilise, allocate and utilise human and material resources in an efficient and productive manner. At the micro level, human and institutional capacity is critical to sound project management and public administration.

The framework

The general situation in Africa today suggests that capacity building is required in relation to the following priority areas:

- good governance, to ensure stability;

-economic management, to maximise resource mobilisation and promote sustainable development;

- human resource development, to support employment creation and income generation, and reduce poverty;

- science and technology, to increase the efficiency of the population and facilitate infrastructural development;

-enterprise development, to enhance the critical role of the private sector in overall development.

The degree of emphasis given to each of the above in a given context would vary according to the level and complexity of existing human and institutional capacities, the economic and financial means to support capacity, the relative roles of the public and private sectors, and the degree of involvement of civil society in the decision-making process.

The policy context for institutional capacity building should be multi-sectoral and flexible, but coherent in relation to the desired objectives of development. This is to ensure that the process of capacity building is adaptable to changing circumstances-an issue that is particularly relevant in the context of countries undertaking structural adjustment and economic reform programmes when there is a need effectively to nurture and utilise local skills and to mobilise investment resources efficiently.

In the light of the development challenge facing African countries, the process of capacity building in the region requires, above all, appropriate and adequate human and institutional capabilities to plan and manage economic and social development processes. These capabilities should include the means of assessing the achievements and impact of capacity building on poverty reduction, employment creation, etc. Existing public sector institutions for development planning and management could provide the operational framework for national capacity building, but the process should also include the participation of diverse social forces, the private sector and non-governmental institutions.

Regarding the role of external donors and technical assistance agencies, the approach should be based on the concept of 'partners in development', which implies consultation and dialogue between donor and recipient on all aspects of project planning, design and implementation- with project 'ownership' resting with national authorities. Technical assistance from foreign donors should therefore go mainly towards developing the necessary domestic capacity, rather than contributing to the undermining of existing or potential capacity. Furthermore, assistance provided by external donors should be directed towards the building of capacity for promoting regional economic cooperation and integration through support for the development of viable African regional and sub-regional development organisations.

Support initiatives

The issue of domestic capacity building in Africa has more recently been the focus of attention by the international community as a whole. Indeed, the former World Bank vice-president for Africa, Edward Jaycox, has described 'capacity building' es the 'missing link in African development' which is 'critical to the development effort (of the region) and the chances of success'. UN agencies, spearheaded by the UNDP, have been active in promoting capacity building as a major requirement for attaining sustainable development.

In 1991, the UNDP Governing Council took a decision which resulted in the development of guidelines covering assistance to governments in the formulation and implementation of national capacity building strategies relating to all stages of the project cycle in the developing countries. The decision coincided with the introduction of the 'programme approach' by the UNDP which emphasised the centrality of national development programmes as the hub for the integration of UN technical assistance activities with national efforts. Emphasis on the use of national skills in the development process was consolidated within the general operational framework for 'national execution', which implied that overall responsibility for management of UN operational activities and accountability remained with the government and other national institutions and beneficiaries who 'owned' these activities. Under these new arrangements, a high priority was thus placed on the strengthening and sustaining of development management and administrative capacities on a long-term basis as an integral part of UNDP technical assistance.

The World Bank's interest in capacity building in Africa has been more closely linked to the need for administrative and technical capacity at the national level to carry out policy analysis and economic management in the context of on-going structural adjustment and economic reform programmes. In a trailblazing address to the African American Institute Conference in 1993, Mr Jaycox came out strongly in favour of a new approach to lending to African countries which gave top priority to the development of critical human and institutional capacity. He admitted that the Bank's $4 billion a year lending programme in sub-Saharan Africa had not had the desired impact on development in the region because not enough attention had been paid to national capacity in the past. He went on to criticise the international donor community and financial institutions, including the World Bank itself, for designing and carrying out technical assistance activities which not only fail to solve problems but end up undermining the development of capacity in Africa. Mr Jaycox accordingly pledged to give direct support to capacity building in the Bank's lending programmes, mainly through human resource development and the creation of a 'demand for professionalism in Africa.'

The UNDP, the African Development Bank and the World Bank, collaborated in the early 1990s to set up the 'African Capacity Building Foundation' (ACBF), based in Harare, Zimbabwe, with initial seed money of about $30 million and another $70 million attracted from bilateral donors and African governments themselves. The fund is to be used by the Foundation to support capacity building in Africa through training and institution building. Particular attention will be paid to the rehabilitation and strengthening of selected research and training institutions to meet the challenge of indigenous capacity building. Another initiative set up with foreign donors and African support, the Africa Research Consortium in Nairobi, is a good example of collaboration at regional level that is contributing to capacity building in the critical area of economic policy analysis and management. Similarly, the African Development Bank helped establish the African Business Round table which promotes entrepreneurship and enterprise development based on African ownership and control.

Role of the ILO

For well over three decades the ILO, as part of its technical cooperation programme in Africa, has been involved in a wide range of management development, productivity and institution building initiatives at both national and regional levels. This is consistent with the need to strengthen African training institutions to play a crucial role in providing development managers with the necessary skills to analyse and formulate policy options and manage public and private enterprises efficiently.

One of the most successful initiatives undertaken by the ILO, in collaboration with the UNDP and the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank, is the UNEDIL programme for strengthening management training in Africa. Since its inception in 1987, the UNEDIL programme has proven to be a worthwhile initiative in institutional capacity building in the management field. Support for the programme has also come from national and regional management development institutes (MDIs) in Africa, regional and sub-regional organisations such as SADC and the Commonwealth Secretariat, and major bilateral donors such as USAID, CIDA, NORAD, the Netherlands and France.

Apart from aiming at strengthening institutional capacity, the UNEDIL programme has been instrumental in fostering networking among African development institutes and promoting professional contacts and the exchange of experience. One outcome of the programme has been the revival of three subregional MDI associations which enjoy the direct support of UNEDIL and serve as focal points for UNEDIL's subregional networking arrangements.

Networking on a subregional basis has made it possible to optimise the use of scarce resources and talents, and this has helped to increase managerial capacity in the region as a whole. Collaboration has also permitted an exchange of experience among African institutions, and has brought together expertise both from within Africa and from outside to assist in the development of managerial capacity across the continent. This fits in with the goals of technical cooperation in general, and of South-South cooperation in particular.

F.L.

Increasing demands and diminishing resources in higher education

by Professor Dumitru Chitoran

As we approach the end of the millennium, higher education world-wide finds itself in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, it is witnessing unprecedented growth. Enrolments are on the increase and so are the expectations placed on it by society. The correlation between investment in higher education and research, and the level of social, economic and cultural development of nations is well-established and is gaining increasing ground at a time when all development has become knowledge-intensive. On the other hand, higher education is in a state of crisis in practically all countries of the world, under the pressure of serious financial constraints. It has to compete for public funds with many other sectors and very often it is among the first to undergo severe cuts. These cuts have reached a dramatic threshold in the developing countries. As a result, the gap between the developing and the developed countries with regard to higher learning and research is wider than ever and it continues to grow.

Inter-university cooperation has emerged as a major tool for the support of higher education in the developing countries and as a flexible mechanism for the rapid transfer and sharing of knowledge, channelled via university links and exchanges. As emphasised in the Policy Paper for Change and Development in Higher Education issued by UNESCO in 1995, 'the most pressing need for international cooperation in higher education is to reverse the process of decline of institutions in the developing countries, particularly in the least developed.' The internationalisation of higher education has advanced steadily, reinforced by current processes of economic and political integration and facilitated by the steady advances in information and communication technologies. But, as indicated in the UNESCO World Education Report (1993), it is increasingly subject to the competitive laws of the market. Universities have been urged to develop an entrepreneurial, commercial attitude and to regard international cooperation mainly as a source of additional income. Fees for foreign students have risen considerably in many countries. As a result, academic mobility is becoming more North-North and less South-North or South-South. The benefits of study abroad, of exchanges, networking and access to data are recognised, but the costs involved render them increasingly a privilege, restricted to those who can afford it.

An innovative programme

UNESCO's response to these trends was the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme, launched in 1991. While serving as an instrument to foster overall inter-university cooperation, it was aimed at giving a clear direction and goal, namely to support higher education in the developing countries. It was meant to mark a return to the spirit of international academic solidarity, through twinning, networking and other linking arrangements among universities. The programme was also designed as an innovative form for the rapid transfer of knowledge, and for institutional development in higher education, including the establishment of transnational centres for advanced studies and research, as a means of redressing the widening knowledge gap between industrially developed and developing countries. One other aim of the Programme was to alleviate the negative effects of the brain drain.

The UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme has seen steady and dynamic development from the very beginning, and has emerged as the major thrust of UNESCO's action in the field of higher education. The favoured institutional framework for carrying out activities is a UNESCO Chair. The programme's activities are extremely diverse. They include the appointment of visiting professors, provision of scholarships and fellowships, facilitating of staff and student exchanges and undertaking of joint research. The 'chairs' are typical of basic units of research and training, with a strong international dimension, since either the chairholder, or some of the professors or researchers associated with its programme come from abroad. Other projects involve complex inter university networks, varying in size from three to more than 50 institutions. Within networks, certain institutions serve as focal points, responsible for initiating activities and securing broad participation in their execution. Also included are cooperation programmes established by UNESCO with major university associations and networks in order to carry out UNITWIN-related activities.

At present, there are 163 established UNESCO Chairs (a further 84 are under consideration) and 34 largescale networks (18 more are being developed). A total of over 750 teachers, researchers and other support staff are involved in their activities. It is estimated that 350 courses (mainly at the graduate level), attended by more than 7500 students, were organised by the established UNESCO Chairs during the 1992-1996 period. Also, 120 seminars, training workshops, symposia and colloquia were staged over the same period, attended by more than 6000 participants. Some 580 academics from developing countries spent short periods of time at partner universities in the developed countries to upgrade their training. In addition, 355 scholarships have been granted to students and young academics from developing nations within the framework of the Programme. Research has been encouraged through 240 projects (mainly joint ones) resulting, according to progress reports received so far, in the publication of 55 volumes, some 100 published articles and over 150 monographs and progress reports.

The ACPs in the programme

A large number of these projects (UNESCO Chairs and networks) concern ACP countries. Africa has been given top priority. Over 30 of the established Chairs are located there and 18 more are under consideration for subSaharan Africa, in order to reinforce the contribution of the programme to the development of higher education in this region. In addition, certain projects located at institutions in Europe and North America carry on activities which are designed to support African universities. A few examples illustrate this. Starting from its bilateral links with several African universities, the University of Utrecht proposed developing these into a broader, multilateral project under the umbrella of UNITWIN. For this purpose, it joined forces with three other European institutions: the University of Lund in Sweden, the Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany and the University of Porto in Portugal. The result was the establishment of the Utrecht/Southern Africa/UNITWIN (USU) network. It includes, at its southern pole, the universities of Harare, Maputo, Namibia, and Western Cape, where UNESCO Chairs have been established in different fields. The aim is to develop each of them into (sub)regional centres of advanced study and research. This is well under way in the case of the UNESCO Chair in Mathematics and Science Education at Western Cape University in South Africa. A first step was to link its activities to those of the MESA (Mathematics Education in South Africa) project, a cooperation project between the Utrecht-Freundenthal Institute for Mathematics Education and the University of the Western Cape. A school for Science and Maths Education is to be established at the University of Western Cape.

Another large scale project is the Network of African Teacher Training Institutions, built around a UNESCO Chair at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Dakar. This is designed to serve as a regional centre for postgraduate training and research in the field of education. After several years preparation, activities were launched in 1995. The strength of networking is illustrated by a number of other linking arrangements in support of African higher education institutions. These include the network initiated by the NATURA Group of European universities in the field of agriculture, the ORBICOM Network in the field of Communication, which is a global network but pays particular attention to the needs of African universities, and the UNESCO/John Hopkins University Networking and Partnership in Adolescent Youth Health and Development. The last-mentioned focuses on HlV/AIDS-related research, and includes institutions such as Addis Ababa and Makerere Universities.

The agreement signed by UNESCO with the Association of African Universities (AAU) within the framework of UNITWIN provides for support of the latter's staff development and management programme. A UNESCO Chair in Educational Management and Administration is to be established. It will function on a rotating basis at several universities in South Africa, Botswana and Malawi. There are also a number of 'tailor-made' chairs which respond to more specific needs of institutions, notably to develop training and research capabilities in areas such as human rights, democray and peace (at the Universities of Namibia, Addis Ababa and Fianarantsoa in Madagascar), or in the field of Water Resources and Water Culture (at the Universities of Malawi and Omdurman in Sudan). In the latter field, an interesting example is the UNESCO Chair established at the University of Nice, which, although located in France, carries out its activities in Mauritania and has produced the most comprehensive study so far on water resource management in that country.

The programme has also made a good start in the Pacific and the Caribbean, even if achievements there are on a more modest scale. There are already 22 established chairs with 14 more under consideration. They cover a wide spectrum of priority fields, including the sustainable use of rain forest resources at the University of Guyana, higher education management and information technology at the University of Havana in Cuba, educational sciences in Fiji, and the use of drugs in Chulalongkorn University in Thailand.

UNESCO works closely with the University of the South Pacific and the University of the West Indies, with which it has established four UNESCO Chairs. Moreover, it has signed a cooperation agreement, in the framework of UNITWIN, with the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Association of Commonwealth Universities for activities in both regions. There is great potential for the further development of the Chairs programme in the Pacific and Caribbean, given the existence of the two regional universities mentioned above and the strong interest of universities in a number of developed countries (such as Australia, Canada, Japan and Spain) in supporting the programme. It appears to be particularly well suited for the systems of higher education in the two regions.

Funding

The cost of international cooperation in higher education has risen steadily and this is currently one of the major obstacles preventing the full use of the potential of academic links. New information and communication technologies help reduce costs, but universities in the least-developed countries would first need considerable investment in order to procure and maintain the necessary equipment. That is why UNESCO has based the Chairs programme on funding principles aimed at lowering costs and sharing them in a genuine spirit of academic solidarity.

At the outset, UNESCO made it very clear that, since it was not a funding agency, it could not, by itself, assume the financial burden of such an ambitious programme, involving several hundred institutions and thousands of university teachers, researchers and students. However, it decided to make a commitment by providing some initial funds. Rough estimates indicate that, over the 1992-1995 period, UNESCO has contributed some $2.5 million (from its Regular and Participation Programmes, Fellowship Bank and Funds-in-Trust) to the UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs Programme. At the same time, it has pressed for increased international development aid for higher education, particularly from the developed countries, and from international organisations, including the UN specialised agencies. A strong case is made for the benefit of pooling resources and for involving directly the higher education institutions themselves

UNITWIN-based projects, including UNESCO Chairs, are usually initiated through the direct contributions of UNESCO (the range is generally between $15 000 and $25 000 per individual project). This is meant to help prepare and launch projects and to secure further funding from other sources. The institutions themselves must include allocations for the respective projects in their own budgets and request their appropriate national authorities to make contributions. This applies equally to universities in the developing countries, however poor their resources may be. It serves to indicate that the project in question is indeed seen as a priority by them and by their national authorities.

Experience of the UNITWIN funding formula so far gives cause for cautious optimism. Many projects have been able to secure funds by having recourse to the various sources mentioned above. Thus, the Utrecht/ Southern Africa/UNITWIN Project received a first UNESCO allocation of $50 000 in 1993, in order to launch its activities. The fact that it concerned a large-scale project (a network of eight universities, with four chairs established at four African universities and one at the University of Utrecht) explains the larger UNESCO allocation. This was followed by a second allocation of $70 000 in 1994 for the actual implementation of activities in Africa. The UNESCO seed money led to additional funding-$600 000 annually, for the 1992-1995 period, from various Dutch donors (mainly the Ministry of Development Cooperation, through NUFFIC) and from the European Union, and $450 000 from the University of Utrecht budget, including the total cost for the functioning of the UNESCO Chair on African Studies established at that university. The other three European universities participating in the network (Bochum, Lund and Porto) have also made contributions and are now looking for donor funding in their countries. It is important to mention that the four African universities belonging to the network have also allocated funds from their own budgets to the UNITWIN projects and are actively seeking additional resources from aid and development programmes established for their countries by various donor agencies.

It can be fairly argued that in terms of cost-effectiveness, efficiency and the ability to generate funding from various sources, UNITWIN compares favourably with existing cooperation schemes in higher education and research. But it is still too early to conclude that the Chairs Programme can continue and develop further on the basis of the present funding arrangements. The needs are arguably too big for the institutions and individuals involved, who may find themselves in a perpetual search for funds. An evaluation of the programme is under way and this will be submitted to the Member States for their decision. UNESCO is hoping that its efforts to revive academic solidarity, and its campaign in favour of higher education in the developing countries will receive the support of the international community. More than ever before, these countries need to develop their capacity for advanced training and research in order to achieve self sustainable development. The academic community has already indicated its willingness to join forces with UNESCO in this undertaking.

D.C.

When a highly qualified professional chooses to leave his own country for another, he does so for one or several legitimate political or economic reasons: peace and security for himself and his family, job satisfaction, better pay and conditions. a higher standard of living, etc. Throughout history, countries and centres of academic excellence which offer these attractions have received the largest numbers of professional migrants and these have, in turn, made substantial contributions, not only to the economic growth of their host countries, but also to the scientific and technological advancement of humanity. The wave of German scientists who moved to the United States after the Second World war, and their discoveries and inventions, come readily to mind. On a global level, therefore, the free movement and interaction of highly skilled people is a positive thing. But the costs to the home countries of losing their professionals is incalculable-in terms of both development opportunities and loss of investment.

Whereas Western Europe was the main loser, especially to the United States, up until the 1960s, the developing countries have emerged in recent years as the biggest suppliers of qualified professionals to the industrialised world as a whole. Today there are more than a million and a half skilled expatriates from the developing countries settled in Western Europe, the USA, Japan and Canada. The USA's educational system and its research institutions are heavily dependent on them. These migrant professionals contribute in no small way to increasing the disparities between the world's rich and poor nations. And it is the developing countries that need them most.

Africa, which has serious shortages of manpower, has been worst hit. It is said to have lost 60 000 professionals (doctors, university lecturers, engineers, surveyors, etc) between 1985 and 1990 and to have been losing an average of 20 000 annually ever since.

There are more than 21 000 Nigerian doctors practising in the United States alone. Meanwhile, Nigeria's own health system suffers a cruel lack of medical practitioners. 60% of all Ghanaian doctors trained locally in the 1980s have left the country, according to the UNDP's 1992 Human Development Report, while, in Sudan, 17% of doctors and dentists, 20% of university lecturers, 30% of engineers and 45% of surveyors have gone to work abroad.

Although it is difficult to calculate the cost of an expatriate professional in terms of the nutrition, health care and education provided by households and the State, it is clear developing countries are losing colossal amounts of investment annually to the developed countries.

The US Congressional Research Service, for example, computed in 197172 that the USA gained $20 000 annually on each skilled migrant from the developing countries. If this rather conservative amount is extrapolated for Africa, then the continent lost more than $1.2 billion of investment between 1985 and 1990 on the 60 000 or so African professionals who emigrated during that period. Much closer perhaps to the truth today would be the estimate made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), using 1979 prices, which put a cash value of $184 000 on each African professional migrant (and this only for those between the ages of 25 and 35).

On the other hand, expatriate remittances, particularly from skilled workers who earn higher salaries than the average migrant, constitute an important source of funds for development in their home countries. Throughout Africa, households are being maintained by remittances from relatives working abroad. Also, fine buildings are being put up and small-scale projects are financed in villages and cities across the continent with funds sent from overseas. But taken together, these will never be large enough to compensate Africa for the loss of investment suffered as a result of the 'brain drain'.

Serious flaw in international cooperation

The migration of highly qualified professionals from the developing countries is an extremely complex problem which presents the international community with a major dilemma. First, the 'brain drain' cannot be stopped by force nor can it be legislated against. It is linked to fundamental human rights- the right of individuals to move from one country to another, although the exercise of that right is governed by the immigration policies of individual countries. Second, it is fundamentally a national problem which can only be resolved at the national level by providing enough incentives for qualified nationals to remain at home. Third, some industrialised countries like the USA and Canada, have historically operated liberal immigration policies. Even European states, whose immigration policies tend to be more restrictive, have a good number of third world professionals, but there are over a million in the USA and Canada. It is arguable whether, under the circumstances, the liberalisation of the international labour market under the World Trade Organisation, as is being suggested (even by some developing countries), will actually be in Africa's interests.

The reasons for Africa's brain drain problem are legion and easily identifiable, being both structural and economic. The most often cited cause is the continent's school curricula which many see as still largely modelled on the systems of the former colonial masters. This, it is argued, has led to the production of graduates in disciplines that have little or no relevance to the socio-cultural and economic milieux of the continent. This is a highly debatable assertion, given the large numbers of the technical assistants currently working in Africa who are products of the educational systems of the former colonial powers-at least some of whom are having a positive impact on the continent's development. This, however, must not distract from the fact that African higher schools systems are illequipped to produce the right skills for Africa's development needs. Because of shortages of both science equipment and teachers, the system instructs the vast majority of pupils in arts rather than in science and technology-and it is the latter which hold the key to economic growth and development. Thus, there is overproduction of graduates in areas where there are few employment opportunities. This results in high levels of migration, even, paradoxically among the few trained scientists because of the absence of an environment conducive to full professional expression and satisfaction. It is not uncommon for things as simple as electricity and water supply to provide reasons for emigration. Examples abound of frustrated African scientists who have had their experimental work of several years destroyed overnight through power failures.

Powerful factors in the brain drain include Africa's poor rates of economic growth over the past 30 years (worsened by structural adjustment measures which have resulted in dramatic falls in living standards) and political instability (disturbances in Nigeria and Zaire, civil war in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia etc). Thousands of qualified professionals have been forced unwillingly into exile, and the majority of those left behind, in these times of serious economic crisis, are engaged in unskilled pursuits-in petty trading and taxi driving-far removed from their professional training. The loss of investment associated with this situation cannot be underestimated.

Sub-Saharan Africa is in the paradoxical situation today of having large numbers of graduates in various disciplines -from medicine and engineering to architecture and accountancy-who have either emigrated or are simply unemployed, while it hosts a large army of foreign technical assistants. Indeed, Africa receives more advice per capita than any other continent. In 1988, there were more than 80 000 technical assistants, and today the figure is well over 100 000. These experts are believed to cost donors a total of $4bn annually to maintain, a figure which represents nearly 35% of Africa's total official development aid. This situation reveals a serious flaw in the operation of international development cooperation. Would it not be more efficient and cost effective to employ qualified African expatriates in the place of many of these foreign technical experts. The former, after all, have both linguistic and cultural links with the continent. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a programme in this area which points to a possible way forward. The article on that programme, TOKTEN, follows.

A.O.

On the scale of the brain drain problem facing the developing countries, the UNDP's Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project may not amount to much, but it has proved, in its 19 years of existence, to be a cost-effective way of getting highly qualified expatriates from the developing countries to contribute to the development of their countries of origin.

It all started in Turkey in 1977 by pure accident. A Turkish mineral expert in Alberta, Canada, was asked by a compatriot if he would be kind enough to come over to Turkey and explain his innovative coal cleaning process to the staff and students of his old university in Ankara-the Middle East Technical University. He expressed his interest in the project. Soon afterwards he was contacted by the UNDP which offered to fund part of his trip to Ankara. The expert spent one month in Turkey giving a series of seminars, not only at the Middle East Technical University, but also at the Istanbul and Dokuz Eylul Universities. During these lectures, he made recommendations on resolving Turkey's specific coal utilisation problems. His impact was immense and such that the UNDP was inspired to set up the TOKTEN project along similar lines to help developing countries gain from the knowledge of their expatriate professionals.

The system is simple. Member States of the United Nations can apply to join the project. The latter is administered in each country by a National Working Commitee (NWC) which is made up of representatives from the government, local organisations, the private sector and the UNDP. Institutions of that country (government ministries and agencies, private and public sector enterprises, universities, research and development institutions, hospitals, etc) can apply for assistance in a variety of areas.

Applications are processed by the NWC and recruitment of experts is usually in one or more of the following ways:

— through consultants with lists of experts recognised by the Government as having extensive contacts within their expatriate communities;

— through embassies and missions, alumni associations and research institutions;

— through prominent members of the country's expatriate community who identify and alert other high level expatriates of the opportunities to return home and serve their countries.

When the Working Committee chooses a consultant, an offer of assignment is made. The beneficiary organisation and the consultant will then determine the timing of the mission and inform the UNDP.

TOKTEN assignments last between one and three months depending on the ability of the consultant and the needs of the beneficiary'. They are not meant to be highly remunerative. Consultants are only entitled to round trip economy fare tickets (by the most direct route) and a daily subsistence allowance at the prevailing UN rate. The costs are paid out of the beneficiary country's 'Indicative Planning Figure'(IPF) which is the amount of assistance the UNDP makes available to a developing country over a five-year programming cycle. Health insurance cover and accommodation is not provided. Usually these are the responsibilities of the beneficiary government or organisation. The salaries of the consultants during their absence are paid by their affiliated employers whose agreement is often necessary for the projects to go ahead.

TOKTEN consultants are thus not motivated by money but by a genuine desire (with a modicum of patriotism) to contribute to the development of their countries of origin to which they retain strong cultural and linguistic ties. And their impact on the ground is usually immediate and measurable. Pressures are not put on volunteers to return permanently to their countries, although many have chosen to do so since the programme began in 1977.

The system is not only low-cost and cost-effective. It covers a great variety of specialised fields and enables programmes to be implemented with speed.

Conditions for success

A UNDP assessment of the programme in 1987, ten years after it began, concluded that regular monitoring of its operation had enabled information garnered to be applied to increase its effectiveness. It had been found, for example, that short-term expatriate consultancies were especially beneficial when the problem tackled was specific and the consultant selected was of international standing, when both the requesting organisation and the expatriate were well prepared in advance, and when the initial mission was followed up by a series of measures, often including a return visit.

By 1992, 35 countries were participating in the programme and over 3800 consultancies had been run. Since then, the number of countries has increased dramatically to 51 and con

sultancies to 5000. In 1994 and 1995 alone, 28 countries reported over 700 consultancies.

It has also become clear that, whereas the main recipient institutions have been government agencies, science and technology research institutions, universities and organisations, the private sector is increasingly showing interest in the programme. The number of female specialists is also increasing: in 1991, 40 consultants were women and last year this figure rose to over 100.

So far, the ACP countries participating in the programme are; Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Sierra Leone, St Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago and Uganda.

Success stories include a highly skilled Guyanese medical practitioner in the United States who returned home after 17 years to assume the post of minister of health. He had been sent to oversee the introduction of certain aspects of health care such as preventive medicine (immunisation, general child care and nutrition), treatment of trauma (victims of accidents and violence etc) and the establishment and management of the physical facilities for emergency patients. During his stint, his recommendation on the upgrading of the emergency room facilities was rapidly implemented and this contributed significantly to improving patient care. Another story involved a Guinean banker who, after a consultancy stint in Guinea, abandoned a lucrative job in France to return home permanently to work at the Central Bank of Guinea, helping to set up a new loan system for commercial imprt and export businesses. Guinea, in fact, has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the TOKTEN programme with numerous consultancies involving the University of Conakry, covering more than 20 disciplines.

For very small sums the programme is ensuring that developing countries which have invested enormously in the education of their expatriate nationals have a return, at least, in the form of the knowledge they oquired.

A.O

The role of the Commonwealth in the economic and social progress of its member states is neither widely known nor widely publicised. Yet for over 25 years, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) has made significant contributions to the efforts of its developing member countries to accelerate the pace of their economic development.

The recognition by the Commonwealth that people are its greatest resource forms the basis of its approach to development assistance-providing, in the short term, specialist technical skills which are either not available or are in short supply to governments to enable them to fill key positions in areas as diverse as export and industrial promotion, high-level economic and legal services etc, and in the longer term, a wide range of training programmes in areas that are crucial for economic development.

The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation is funded by voluntary financial contributions from member governments which, as has just been mentioned, can also draw on it according to their needs and priorities. As a pioneer of technical cooperation between developing countries, the Fund recruits its experts from these countries and encourages South/South cooperation. It is thus not uncommon to see West Africans serving, on short-term contracts, as legal officers in remote Pacifc island states or Sri Lankans or Indians advising on new agricultural techniques in Africa. The Fund is administered by four separate divisions within the Commonwealth Secretariat: the management and training division; the general technical assistance division; the export and industrial development division, and the economic and legal advisory services division. In 1994-95 the CFTC's financial resources stood at around f23.6 million (ECU 30m).

Human resource development

Nearly one-third of the CFTC's budget is spent on human resource development, helping enhance people's skills through a mix of training workshops, study visits and individual attachments.

Some 4000 training fellowships were awarded in 1993-95 to enhance technical skills. These were given to middle and senior professional, technical and administrative managers to study at some of the Commonwealth's best institutions or to take up work attachments (63% of training takes place in less-developed countries).

The Fund also enables universities and other institutions to become centres of excellence and upgrade the tuition they offer by appointing academic and technical specialists. In 1993-95, for example, it helped five universities in Africa and the Caribbean to run applied Masters courses through collaboration with other Commonwealth universities.

As the CFTC is usually able to meet only 60% of the requests it receives for specialised training, its programmes are held on a regional and pan-Commonwealth basis to maximise impact, especially in topics such as administrative reform, financial management and strategic planning.

The Fund's training priorities include:

- first and foremost, identifying needs (consultants are sent to countries to examine their development plans and help them to prioritise training needs).

- providing education and training in key areas that reflect CFTC concerns such as well-managed economic and financial reform by government, sustainable development, participation of women and application of technology.

- ensuring an integrated package of consultancy, advice and training to help managers in government, and public and private sector enterprises to coordinate and manage reforms and restructuring.

- organising policy workshops and seminars that bring together senior government officials, executives and academics from Commonwealth countries to pool experiences, learn examples of best practice, discuss problems and reflect on emerging issues.

- giving support to institutions to offer new and specialised education and training programmes.

- providing technical and vocational training under the Commonwealth Industrial Training and Experience Programme (between 1993 and 1995, workshops were held in hospital equipment repairs, railway repairs and maintenance and computer-assisted manufacturing).

- providing training in information systems, new technologies and environmental issues (governments are helped to develop management information systems and apply information technology).

-setting up programmes for women with a particular focus on entrepreneurs and community managers (among other initiatives, the CFTC is helping three African universities develop specialised programmes in entrepreneurship for women in non-traditional sectors).

-coordinating wider linkages among professional networks to facilitate exchanges of information and examples of best practice (the CFTC recently helped to set up the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management to assist in improving public service performance and in raising ethical standards).

Expertise on tap

Shortage of skills is one of the biggest stumbling-blocks facing countries trying to raise the living standards of their people. Providing experts accounts for about one-third of the CFTC's budget.

Because its assistance is relatively small and carefully targeted, it avoids the potential waste associated with larger scale projects and poor technical planning. In 1993-95, the cost both of a typical long-term expert and an average project was around £50 000 (ECU 62 000) a year. Experts can be in place within three or four weeks of project approval.

During the same period, over 200 long- and short-term experts were provided to 43 developing Commonwealth countries, six dependent territories and 18 regional organisations. The expertise requested is extremely diverse, from hydrography and agroforestry to tourism, statistics, legal affairs, health, social planning and computer science.

Assignments for short-term experts can range from a few days to six months. Their role is advisory, helping governments to introduce new systems or technologies. Long-term experts stay usually from six months to two years; others may stay up to four years. Experts assist in the development and implementation of policies or in the provision of managerial skills and the training of counterpart staff to take over in due course. Some long-term experts are trainers in specialist fields.

The CFTC makes every effort to appoint women experts. In 1993-95, they made up 13% of experts that were sent to the field. These included a consultant anaesthetist in Ghana, an agricultural economist in Mozambique, an information specialist in Barbados, a fisheries development officer in Papua New Guinea and an environmental lawyer in Seychelles.

A scheme to allow suitably qualified and experienced people to volunteer as short-term experts for a maximum of three months was launched in mid-1995. The scheme draws on experts from the Commonwealth who are willing to give their services on a voluntary basis to developing countries.

Entrepreneurs come first

In its help to small businesses, the CFTC focuses on those who manage the businesses and identify new entrepreneurial talent. Most assistance is given to small states, especially in the Pacific. The programme has three phases: the first relates to 'surveys of opportunity' which is aimed at identifying suitable entrepreneurs, investment opportunities and potential for expansion as well as specific problems. Next comes 'workshops on entrepreneurship development' during which business owners and operators are helped to think creatively, to become more aware of opportunities that are available and to act strategically when planning expansion. And the last are what we call 'business clinics' in which one-to-one counselling is provided to an entrepreneur at his or her business. This personal support has proved very successful in helping individual entrepreneurs to become more efficient and competitive and, by implication, adapt to changing world economic conditions.

Developing exports

The CFTC has pioneered the use of Contact-Promotion programmes and 'Buyer-Seller Meets' forums to help small exporters. These forums allow company representatives, often from small Commonwealth countries, to display their wares and meet prospective buyers from other countries. CFTC consultants plan these activities well ahead, short listing producers that are likely to succeed, identifying suitable foreign markets and advising on redesigning of products. Sometimes exporters and factory staff also receive training.

The CFTC funds a special 'export development programme' for women entrepreneurs. This includes detailed country studies of women engaged in exporting as well as sales promotions abroad. Studies of this type have recently been conducted in Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Zambia.

Women are helped, under the programme, to adapt their handicrafts for export, improve their manufacturing techniques and undertake sales missions abroad. Training is also given in export marketing, product development, costing and pricing. If necessary, changes to government policy are recommended. In 1994, the assistance given to Ghanaian women to develop markets for their basket ware and handicrafts is estimated to have helped generate sales worth US$3.1 million (ECU 2.4m).

by Digby Swift

The European Community's investments in human resource development-health, nutrition and education-in ACP states have regularly been covered in the pages of this magazine whether in the context of dosiers or of country resorts. Here we present a brief description of how the EU's policy in education and training evolved under the Yaounde and Lomé Convemntions.

Educating all the people. This is not just a slogan. In a poor, underdeveloped country, there may be some short-term gains from supplying high quality education and training to an elite few. But, as the 'Asian Miracle' has proved, major long-term gains in development and wealth are possible only if the entire population possesses a reasonable level of education.

Now for the problem. For many countries, notably those of sub-Saharan Africa, a large proportion of school age children receive no education at all. Of those who do attend school, many receive little benefit from their education because of the very low quality of provision. Only a small minority reach secondary education. And yet a higher proportion than ever of national budgets is now going to the education sector.

The problem is urgent because of the time it will take to resolve. Even if we could wave a magic wand to provide all children with a good primary education, it would take a decade to see the benefits.

How is European aid helping to tackle this problem? What have been the guiding principles of European aid to education in the past? And why is the problem still acute in, for example, subSaharan Africa, despite decades of investment in aid to education ?

Aid mirrors developments

Aid to education has mirrored developments in the education sectors of the countries concerned. For example, the low-income countries of Africa, which account for 73% of Africa's population, have seen a rapid expansion in their education systems followed by a collapse of funding. This has resulted in a serious decline in standards of provision. European aid, which began by providing piecemeal assistance to infrastructure and manpower, shifted to a 'project approach' to tackle these emerging problems and is now moving towards a coordinated sectoral approach to help tackle the reform of whole education systems.

From 1970 to 1980, the number of pupils enrolling in the primary schools of developing countries more than doubled, and the numbers in secondary and tertiary education quadrupled. Even relative to the increasing population, there was a 90% increase in the proportion of primary-aged children in school, and a large increase in the proportion of girls. This growth was accompanied by a doubling of government budgetary resources made available to education.

In the massive general economic decline between 1980 and 1985, the money made available for education from the public purse fell by 40%, yet the education systems continued to grow. The result was that teachers' salaries plummeted, and funds for non-salary recurrent costs such as teaching materials and maintenance virtually dried up.

Since 1985, the financial situation has somewhat improved and funding is now at an all-time high. Nevertheless, for many African states, the education sector is in a state of crisis. Buildings are crumbling and inadequate; teachers are untrained or undertrained and often absent because of low incentives and weak supervision. There are few books and other teaching materials. Consequently, many pupils leave school virtually illiterate and innumerate. Moreover, because of the low quality of instruction and increasing costs to parents, many parents are no longer bothering to send children to school even when places are available. Primary enrolment fell by around 10% between 1990 and 1992. Thus in many countries, a fundamental reform of the sector is seen as the only way forward.

Evolution of aid

In the early days of European aid, education and training were seen as suppliers of manpower for countries to modernise their economies. The priority themes of the 1970 Yaounde Convention for European Community aid were industrialisation, regional cooperation and international trade. Community support to education and training focused on the construction of colleges and university faculties to serve industrialisation and regional cooperation.

The 1975 Lomé I Convention referred specifically to 'the establishment of regional institutions of advanced technology, in the context of training programmes to enable nationals to participate fully in economic development'.

The 1980 Lomé II Convention introduced multiannual training programmes, and support in the form of training awards and courses/seminars; experts and instructors; teaching equipment; collaboration between training or research establishments and universities. The emphasis was still on vocational training for other sectors.

A significant proportion of European bilateral aid to education and training took the form of European teachers for secondary schools, colleges and universities. These helped to cover the shortage of locally trained teachers, whilst educating an elite able to fill senior and middle positions in the public and private sectors.

By 1985, problems were becoming all too apparent within the education systems being supported. As in other sectors, there was increased emphasis on the 'project approach' towards tackling these problems. Thus the Lomé Ill Convention includes support to education and training 'in the form of integrated programmes aimed at a well defined objective'. This could include, for example, 'assisting the ACP States' own efforts to restructure their educational establishments and systems and to update curricula, methods and technology employed, in order to step up the effectiveness and cut back the cost of all types of training'. A concern for under-represented groups, particularly women, was also becoming explicit.

By 1990, the concept of investing in people through education and training had moved high on the donor agenda, and alongside it, a growing concern for sectoral reform. According to the 1989 Lomé IV Convention, 'Cooperation shall be aimed at supporting development in the ACP States, a process centred on man himself and rooted in each people's culture. It shall back up the policies and measures adopted by those States to enhance their human resources, increase their own creative capacities and promote their cultural identities. Cooperation shall also encourage participation by the population in the design and execution of development operations.' In a chapter entitled Operations to enhance the value of human resources, a section on Education and Training refers to supporting the ACP State's efforts to 'reform their basic education institutions and systems, in particular by providing overall primary education coverage and adjusting imported systems as well as building them into development strategies'.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, European states and the Community joined the World Bank in support of structural adjustment. In a 1991 communication to the European Development Council, the Commission stated that it 'will give absolute priority to the social dimension of adjustment, in particular ensuring that the health and education sectors are adequately covered, in conjunction with sectoral reforms introduced or planned in these two areas.'

Balancing this concern for system reform has been a growing appreciation of the importance of decentralised cooperation. An example is the cost-sharing microprojects for grassroots development first introduced in Lomé I with explicit mention of support to primary schools. Another example is the need to support the activities of nongovernmental organisations.

A new policy

Two events in the early 1990s have had a profound impact on European support for education and training. The first was the World Conference on Education for All: Meeting the Basic Learning Needs held in Jomtien in 1990. This emphasised the need for universal

primary education and adult literacy to be firmly placed on the political agenda, and has resulted in a profound swing of donor support away from higher education and towards primary education. The second important event was the 1992 Treaty of European Union which requires the coordination of Member States' policy and operations, particularly in the social sectors. Guidelines are contained in the 1994 Council Resolution on support to education and training in developing countries in which 'the Council emphasises that education, in particular basic education, is a fundamental right'.

According to the Resolution, 'the priority for the Community and the Member States must be both to maximise access to education within the limits of the resources available and to ensure that the quality of education provided is suited to the needs of the majority of students. 'This is to be achieved through 'a balanced, programme-based strategy, tailored to the specific circumstances of the individual developing country', with pride of place accorded to basic education. It should provide 'support to the developing countries' own policies and efforts', not acting as a substitute for local initiative, and should involve better integration of action under structural adjustment with education sector priorities and aid activities. The Council also recommends a special emphasis on coordination in a number of pilot countries.

From the outset, Community aid to education and training in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries has been in response to requests from the ACP states with an emphasis on ownership of the resulting programme by those states. What the new policy introduces into this process is a dialogue between government and all donors on needs, priorities and approaches set in the context of the education sector as a whole. Only through such a comprehensive approach can developing countries and European states reach a true partnership in realising the education and training needs of all citizens on which the future of their countries so crucially depends.

D.S.

by Kenneth Karl

1989 saw the end of the Yalta inspired twin-superpower dominance. Nations had to examine their priorities in their desire for integration in an international environment in which geostrategic and economic realignment would be unavoidable. The philosophy which had served as a basis and reference point for North/South relations throughout the Cold War period is now being called into question and necessary adjustments in ideas have been triggered.

The Lomé Convention, which governs the development-cooperation relationship between the EU and the 70 ACP countries, is a unique North/South cooperation agreement on account of its contractual nature, its durability, the funds it allocates and the fact that it provides for a permanent dialogue. But it is also now at a decisive point in its history.

Those who regard the Convention as out-of-date and in need of renovation, and those more radical critics who believe that it no longer serves any useful purpose and must be phased out, both argue that a new direction is needed.

- Beyond all the criticism formulated against this system, the fundamental question remains as to whether the Lomé Convention will be able, given the necessary changes, to carry on after its fourth version expires.

The years between now and the end of the century will, naturally, see the application of the revised Lomé IV, including the substantial improvements made to it. However, this same period must also be used to prepare the ground for ACP/KU development cooperation in the future, whatever form it might take.

Shortly after his nomination as European Commissioner for relations with the ACP countries and South Africa, Professor Pinheiro commented, realistically, that the ACP countries are no longer 'in fashion'. The change of emphasis can be seen clearly if one looks at the EU's burgeoning relations with its eastern neighbours from the former Communist bloc (illustrated by the wide range of European programmes now benefiting these countries). One might also cite the strengthening of ties with countries in the Mediterranean basin. Economic and security concerns underpin this development, but it undoubtedly reduces the significance which was once accorded to the ACP states.

Moreover, the economic objectives of virtually all EU countries, as they seek to reduce budget deficits and deal with increasing internal social problems inevitably put pressure on the amount of development aid being granted to the Third World.

This situation is, of course, not restricted to the European Union - which in fact remains the world's main contributor of official development aid. At the instigation of a Republican dominated Congress, the United States is planning much more swingeing cuts in its contribution, both to certain international agencies and to certain regions (including Africa).

This undeniable cutback in public development aid has been offset in recent years by net increases in private capital flows, but the geographical distribution is highly skewed. Only a few of the poorest developing countries have benefited from the trend, the main 'winners' being the emerging states of Asia. These include countries such as China, India and Indonesia which, it is worth noting in passing, do not have particularly good human rights records, in the sense that the term is understood in Europe. Despite the fact that ACP countries have identified potential for attracting foreign investment, they have not actually benefited from this change in resource flows.

In this climate, with official development aid in inaeasingly short supply, innovative methods for making optimum use of the available resources must be devised within the context of the Lomé Convention.

On current indications, it is quite possible that in the year 2000, the Lomé Convention will be filed away in the archives. ACP/KU relations will certainly have to be more in step with recent developments on the international scene. The initial reasons for the establishment of a cooperative relationship between Europe and the ACPs, following the signature of the Rome Treaty, are now outmoded. As Paul Valery has commented: 'One of the worst mental aberrations is to think that things can survive when the reasons for their existence have gone'.

So, what type of development cooperation should the countries of the European Union and their ACP partners aim for in the future ?

Alternative trends

The EU has stated that it is in favour of a globalisation of aid within an innovative framework. One of the first questions to be asked is whether uniform cooperation with regions whose monolithic character is being increasingly called into question is still desirable.

Variable geometry in development cooperation relations is increasingly being seen as the trend to be followed.

If this option is chosen, there is a risk of the following scenario being created: The EU's relationship with the Caribbean could become diluted within its relationship with Latin-American countries and links with the Pacific countries could become confused with economic relations with Asia. What would then become of Africa, the continent needing most attention on account of the wide range of its difficulties and its increasing marginalisation ?

In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly, aware of the African question, adopted a new agenda on development in Africa, thus making that continent its number-one priority. Europe, on the other hand, must not simply focus on Africa but must invent new modes of action which are more concrete and more effective.

Secondly, recent trends imply greater conditionality. This has been taken on board not just by EU Member States. A number of multilateral aid agencies have also included it in their strategy. The OECD's Development Aid Committee believes that future relationships between North and South will be greatly influenced by conditionality and, indeed, the Organisation goes so far as to advocate this approach.

However, conditionality in terms of development is a strategic element which must be handled with extreme caution. If cooperation, whether today or in the future, is to be based on conditionality, then it can only be rendered effective if aid recipients (both governments and the governed) are genuinely committed to the idea. They must be convinced, in a climate of resource-scarcity, than the approach is motivated above all by a desire for greater success.

The European Union thus has a vital role to play, making full use of its advantages in terms of dialogue and consultation in order to prevent conditionality being perceived as a condescending mechanism. Thereby, it can help to prevent conditionality from generating the well-known perverse effects of 'tied' aid.

Of course, conditionality raises the thorny question of national sovereignty, but it is important to observe that modern international relations have moved on, both de jure and de facto, from a concept of absolute sovereignty to one of relative sovereignty. This is illustrated by the trend towards humanitarian intervention as a right, the requirements of the Bretton Woods institutions, supranationality in certain regional international organisations, and the very fact of world economic interdependence.

This does not mean that the developing states should sell off their sovereignty to the highest bidder but that conditionality should be the subject of negotiation. Donors must be more flexible in their demands and thereby give the country in question such room to manoeuvre as is necessary for programmes to succeed.

Thirdly, development of the private sector appears now to be approved by all parties. Since independence, the State has been omnipresent and omnipotent in most productive areas of ACP economies. Given the failures of the public sector, private enterprise is now being called in to help. Its development is one of the sector specific policies which will and must receive most support.

The development of the private sector must permit better distribution of the fruits of the growth that it generates and promote integration of the ACP countries into the market economy. There can be no question of pitting private enterprise against the public sector, because any Manichean approach in this sphere might prove to be risky. It is important also to stress that free market development cannot take place overnight and that it is subject to inescapable macro and microeconomic preconditions.

Indeed, the birth and expansion of a dynamic private sector depends on the politico-economic fabric. This includes reliable financial bodies, functioning financial intermediation, adequate infrastructures, technical qualifications and training, a suitable legal/ regulatory framework, institutions to support private businesses, the channelling of the informal sector and a public sector which is prepared to play fair, aware of its regulatory role. These, in short, are the necessary ingredients for the adjustment of the private sector to permit the development of a true enterprise culture.

The development of a harmonious private sector will make it possible more easily to achieve the transformation and export objectives required by international competitiveness. It should, therefore, help to counteract the erosion of commercial preferences generated by the Uruguay Round. The latter's time limits should, in any case, be extended, because it seems clear that the ACP countries will be unable to fulfil their obligations by the end of the moratorium obtained by the EU during the negotiations.

The notion of compensating for inequality that is found in international development law, implies the adoption of a normative system to counteract the weak trading position of developing countries vis-a-vis their competitors in the North. But in recent times, this idea has been losing ground and it is unlikely to cut much ice with the WTO authorities. Legal equality in a situation where there is structural inequality is not, in fact, equitable, and it is therefore necessary to find some other way of mitigating the adverse effects, looking at it in a global context.

Promotion of domestic and foreign investment should be better supported. People talk of the 'risk/ country' threshold that deters foreign investors. It may be that this can be measured objectively by looking at economic and other indicators, but even if this is not possible, it clearly exists as a psychological barrier. This is a problem for many ACP countries and it needs to be crossed, using measures which tackle the many obstacles to investment.

Changing the culture of development cooperation

Besides all the technical aspects, one could argue that the shortcomings of the Lomé Convention stem also from the perceptions of those involved in development cooperation. In short, it is the actual concept and culture of development aid which must be changed.

On the European side, the colonial legacy has conditioned attitudes, imprinting on them a dominant patemalism which is prejudicial to the aim of development. This European concept of cooperation must be overturned. Moreover, development cooperation must not be seen as the art of the possible but as the art of making possible what is strictly necessary, by virtue of genuine negotiation with the countries which have resolved to move forward.

Moreover, it is desirable to have a better developed policy of informing European public opinion about development cooperation. An effort is needed to counter false impressions, such as the one left by the French journalist who wrote: 'Official development aid is like taking money from the poor in rich countries to give it to the rich in poor countries'. Better information is needed to ensure that the public can decide such matters for itself.

Coordinating the Union's policies with those of the Member States now presents an enormous challenge. The political obstacles are huge and development cooperation may well suffer as a result of them if the objectives of coordination, coherence and complementarity contained in the Maastricht Treaty are not achieved.

As for the ACP countries, success in their economic development depends on many factors, cooperation being only one of them. Many political leaders in these nations have too often described cooperation with the North as the only way in which they can develop. In fact, this should be seen as nothing more than an additional factor - supporting the national effort and a genuine desire for development. It is pure fantasy to believe that development can be set in motion solely on the basis of an external impetus. To succeed, it must come from within a country. This is why future cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries must progress towards reinforcing the aptitude of the latter to devise, master and control their own development process.

In the future, the ACP countries must propose concrete and responsible solutions to their partners, doing so by means of the dialogue system. They must also promote development based on participation, particularly with the involvement of young people and women.

The fact that the ACPs can offer a credible prospectus for development must be acknowledged. It is undoubtedly a challenge, but it can successfully be overcome if a climate of stability, security and confidence is created, matched by an unambiguous political will.

In KU/ACP relations, programmes must include the long-term vision necessary for sustainable development. Too often in the past, the strategy has been aimed at an immediate and ostentatious result. Successful development in the future will depend crucially on a change in such attitudes.

K.K.

Let us know what you think

The debate about the future of cooperation between the European Union and the ACP states is now beginning to gash' pace. Last year, we established the 'Analysis' section in The Courier to report on this debate-and give readers an opportunity to express their own views on the subject.

The response so far has been encouraging, but it has come mainly from the European side. We are keen to receive contributions from ACP readers as well. If you have you own ideas or opinions about what should happen after Lomé IV expires, why not put them on paper and send them to us. Our address is on the inside front cover of the magazine.

This was the subject of a conference which took place in Maastricht from 12-14 June, under the auspices of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). It brought together participants from ACP countries and Europe, including representatives of civil society (NGOs, the private sector, etc.). Four major topics were addressed:

· How can a new KU/ACP commercial relationship be constructed ?

There was agreement that some form of preferential trade regime should continue after 2000. Some participants stressed the need to Promote 'fair trade', which would contribute not only to growth but also to development. The impact of individual trade preferences is not always clear-cut, but obviously there cannot be a single solution covering all problems in all ACP countries. An analysis of negative constraints demonstrated the difficulties involved in reconciling the rules of the Lomé Convention and those of the World Trade Organisation.

· How can the private sector become involved in development ?

The most important aspect of this topic is knowing how to create a favourable and business-friendly environment which will enable the private sector to play its part-and the role the European Union could play in this process. The private sector was defined as both formal and informal, encompassing large, medium and small enterprises, whether local or foreign. The importance of a strong local private sector in guaranteeing long-term stability was particularly emphasised. In this respect, the view was expressed that the role of the state and its relationship with the European Commission should be redefined. There was also a call for time to be set aside time for effective dialogue, and to create the space for a partnership between the public and private sectors. It was felt that the role of Economic and Social Councils should be expanded and specified more clearly. As for the specific issue of privatisation, the point was made that this should not be seen as a panacea and that it should be approached on a country-by-country basis.

As regards current instruments, it was noted that their objective is essentially to meet public-sector requirements. The role of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) attracted some criticism. Speakers felt that the private sector should be more involved in the preparation and implementation of cooperation programmes with the European Community. Direct financial support to the private sector was seen as desirable, including backing from the European Investment Bank.

· What partnership ?

The partnership concept was seen to have been eroded over the past two decades, with the pretext of efficiency resulting in a more paternalistic approach. Mechanisms needed to be found to enable EU priorities and the prerogatives of ACP countries to be reconciled. Reference was made to the political nature of the origin of the partnership and the need to find a new political raison d'etre for this type of relationship. The problems of cohesion within the ACP group and its relations with the EU were also raised, and there was a discussion about the possibility of giving the Convention a regional character-although a number of speakers expressed reservations about this.

On the European side, two lacunae emerged, namely coordination between donors, and consistency between Lomé and other Community policies (including relationships with the Bretton Woods institutions).

In addition to the principle of partnership, some participants were keen to stress the motives of solidarity and common interest that lay behind cooperation. It was not simply a matter of 'negative' interdependence. The appropriateness of the term 'partnership' was questioned, if this was only to mean financial and technical cooperation. The politicisation of Lomé appears to be on the agenda, involving a move from the current partnership to a genuine 'contractual approach' through political dialogue.

As for the role of partnership in cooperation policy management, it was felt essential that civil society and the private sector be involved. There was also a discussion of the debt problem.

· How can financial and technical cooperation be improved ?

As usual, reference was made to the need to simplify and differentiate management of Lomé Convention instruments, particularly in the context of the programming process. As regards the role of non-state actors, a cautious approach was recommended. Finally, new instruments were called for to prevent conflict.

· Conclusions

This conference, coming after several others of the same type, was characterised essentially by private sector and NGO calls for greater participation in Community cooperation policy. Moreover, the need for 'politicisation' of the Lomé policy, shifting from purely financial and technical aid to a genuine cooperation contract, seems to have attracted the support of all participants. These questions are sure to figure in the 'Green Paper' on 'tome after 2000', which the European Commission plans to publish before the end of 1996.

Dominique David

On 6 and 7 June, the Belgian Par/iament hosted a UN seminar on 'me future of international development cooperation: new communication challenges' 'Democratising Democracy' was the succinct, journalistic way in which one of the speakers at the meeting summed up his solution to the problem of underdevelop meet. He was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former President of Haiti, who observed that democracy, as advocated by the developed world, and increasingly accepted by developing countries, does not prevent the latter's slide into even greater poverty. The Courier had the opportunity to interview Mr Aristide. We began by asking him whether his statement implied that democracy is failing in a world striving to 'globalise' it J-B.A.-The word democracy comes from the Greek words 'demos', meaning people and 'kratein', meaning to govern. In other words, it signifies government of the people, for the people by the people-but if we take a look at the world today, the impression we get is that not all so-called democratic governments are in fact what they purport to be. Hence the need to 'democratise democracy', so as to create a situation in which all citizens can help set governments on a course towards such a model.

Concepts usually generate conflict and, therefore, when speaking of revolution, democracy or globalisation, it is necessary to be au fait with the subject matter so as not to become involved in a dialogue of the deaf. In the specific case of globalisation, my opinion is that this has a tendency to make what is an already precarious situation even more unbalanced. Concepts cannot be applied everywhere without thought being given to their harmful consequences. This does not mean to say that we should give up completely. It's one thing to speak of the globalisation of peace, as if an ineluctable need existed to promote peace on a world scale, but I'm not sure that everyone would define the globalisation of peace in the same way as I do.

· Could we turn now to your own country, Haiti. How do you view the future of democracy there, bearing in mind the economic circumstances ? At the seminar, you mentioned several factors which demonstrate democracy's *agility.

-Democracy is indeed fragile. 1% of Haiti's population owns 48% of the country's wealth and it is estimated that about 65% of the working population is employed in agriculture as against 5.1% in the 'industrial' sector. But is this really the true picture ? Reality for most people is poverty-unacceptable and sub-human poverty. A man needs work to earn his daily crust by the sweat of his brow, but unemployment has reached catastrophic proportions. When people are unable to earn their living, there is little point in discussing the positive influence of democracy. What is needed is for those with a great deal of wealth and those with less wealth to talk to each other; a dialogue between the private and public sectors, so that we can head off futile conflicts and devote all our efforts to economic growth coupled with human development. I do believe that this is possible.

· Yet, the rich are so rich and the poor so poor. Is it not fantasy to think that the gulf which separates them, and their mutual mistrust, can simply be set aside so that genuine dialogue can take place ?

-This is one of the challenges we have faced ever since 1960 and, although we have not yet reaped the harvest of this process, we have to carry on. It's not too late. We just have to approach the subject logically and with all the facts to hand, and we must have the intelligence to be patient. If we continue with dialogue, we will achieve real results. Only the citizens of Haiti can play a part in Haiti's development-this is not a task for outsiders. We, on the other hand, have to be more receptive to international cooperation, while maintaining mutual respect and dignity. But what we also need is for our own people to act together in order to enhance our own growth. This is not to say that geopolitical reality can be disregarded. Other countries have to be taken into account, but, as a starting point, we have to consider Haiti's human and material resources.

· Thereisdialogueata world level, but there are rules to be applied. I am thinking, here, of free competition. Haiti has to play by the rules, just like any other country.

-Since we gained independence, our history has seen a succession of coups d'etat and people have been over-eager in brandishing weapons to solve economic, political or social problems. Now that democracy has been restored in Haiti, weapons are not the solution to our problems-I cannot stress this enough. What we need is for those with money to sit down and negotiate with those who have none: for the government to get people round the table and devise a common plan to accommodate all interested parties- looking at both the nation's interests and the interests of investors. I do believe that it is possible to achieve this. We have, in fact, already begun to prepare the ground. I am not basing my words, here, on pure theory, but am speaking from experience. In concrete terms, we have to transcend class and racial differences to recognise that Haitian men and women, regardless of their colour and the country they might live in outside Haiti, regardless of their nationality, even, are still part of Haiti's indigenous population. The way must be kept open for dignified and balanced cooperation.

· The other point you mentioned today was that there can be no development without the effective involvement of the population. Are you not leaving yourself open to accusations of having socialist or even communist tendencies ?

-As I have just said, we have to be scientific in our approach and check our facts over and over again. I fail to see how anyone can claim to be working towards peace without looking at poverty which is the greatest threat to social cohesion. Of course, there are those who would deny this assertion, and that is their right. However, rational analysis of the situation can help us alleviate poverty and promote security. It needs to be underlined that security is also one of the essential factors in economics. The UN Security Council is called in to prevent or resolve conflicts. To my mind, we should also be talking about an economic security council to deal with the economic realities. The deeper one plunges into poverty, the greater one's feelings of insecurity-the two always go hand in hand. And insecurity can crop up anywhere in the world. Nor is it a question of charity. It is a real, rational question which must sharpen our awareness, stimulate our common sense and set us on a course to protect the world by alleviating poverty. That, at least, is one approach.

At the same time, you have to recognise that politics is essentially a question of power while economics is influenced by interests. Everyone uses the means at their disposal to defend their personal interests and we know perfectly well that there are no free gifts. The so-called developed countries allocate just 0.3% of their GDP to development aid, yet we are losing our tropical forests at the rate of the area of a football pitch every second. In Haiti, forests now cover only a small area of the country. But in the final analysis, environmental catastrophe threatens us all, rich and poor alike, even if certain countries do not face specific ecological risks. We either deal with it as reasonable people, or we close our eyes to the 'cause and effect' realities.

· Yes, but are we reasonable people ?

-The crisis of ethics is indeed a reality and a great many values are now being called into question. These days, we have to love in order to prove we are not contradicting ourselves. If we believe in God, we might call this love 'God', just as we might call it 'justice'. It all depends on your philosophy, religion or beliefs. If I feel love, I cannot be indifferent to the situation of victims of injustice, both in Haiti and elsewhere. If a man is humiliated, crushed, exploited or marginalised, then 1, too, am humiliated, crushed and marginalised. It is love which makes us fight for justice everywhere. Either one is a demagogue revelling in big words or one is sincere and ready to die so that another might live-this brings immortality.

· One final question. You were speaking just now of insecurity and economics. Is there a link, here, with one of your most recent decisions, the abolition of Haiti's army ? Could you tell us how you were able to pull off this 'coup'?

- I am perfectly happy to answer such an important question and would like to be able to give a clear and direct reply. But given that the struggle is still going on, I don't think I should go into too much detail. A decision was made. The Haitian people opted to rid themselves of the army. Supporting their democratic wish, it was our job to help bring about this dissolution. The army, it is worth recalling, had about 7000 men, absorbed 40% of the national budget-and had killed many of our compatriots. We have had to be logical and patient in achieving this goal, bearing in mind that the guarantors of the agreement which led to my return had their own views, which were different from ours. We also needed courage and wisdom and, above all, the determination of the people. My motto has always been that it is better to fail with the people than to succeed without them, and in this we did not fail. Our task now is not to bask in our own glory but to continue the work of structuring the police force, to prevent it becoming another army. To achieve this, we have to make steady progress and use sound judgment.

Interview by Hegel Goutier

by Jean-Pierre Tilquin and Miguel Amado

This tiny country tucked away at the heart of Africa has, as is well known, been convulsed over the last three years by an acute socio-political crisis. The tragic consequences have included loss of human life, damage to the economic and social infrastructure, and a movement of refugees to neighbouring countries. Burundi, already one of the most densely populated nations in Africa, also has high population growth. It could be argued that it is only thanks to the hard work and perseverance of the farmers (admittedly, 90% of the population) that the country manages to keep going at all.

Agriculture in Burundi follows traditional lines and is based on a farming system divided between food crops for consumption by the farmer and his family, and cash crops (mainly coffee, tea and cotton). Although at the beginning of the decade the crops grown for food were sufficient to meet the population's needs, today demographic pressures are forcing farmers to increase food-crop production. It is these pressures that have prompted them to descend into the marshlands which cover approximately 110 000 hectares (8% of cultivable land in Burundi). These marshes are flooded during the rainy season and so allow rice to be cultivated.

Population growth has also meant that fields cannot be left fallow for long periods. This has resulted in more intensive use of marginal land and an increase in forest clearing. Such practices exacerbate erosion of cultivated areas. The loss of organic matter and nutrients leads to reduced soil fertility and lower yields. Although rainfall in Burundi is high, the soil is only moderately fertile, because of factors such as acidity, aluminium toxicity, and phosphorus immobilisation.

While 20% of land suitable for cultivation is currently given over to growing dry beans-a staple in the Burundi diet - various factors now point towards farming the low-lying marshlands, with a particular emphasis on rice. This is one way of increasing the useful agricultural surface area of the country.

The events of 1993 (democratic elections, followed by the assassination of President Ndadaye), have created a period of instability which has been highly damaging for the country's agriculture. Some people lost their property and livelihood, and are only now slowly re-establishing themselves. The environment has also suffered as a result of the sheer numbers of displaced people. They occupy areas, both urban and rural, which were completely unprepared for the flood of people. it is estimated that 50 000 hectares of forest have been destroyed as a result-with devastating consequences for the country's ecosystem. What is more, the rate of demographic growth has led to overfarming and to a reduction in the average surface area of farms (to 0.7 ha per household).

Rice-a crop for the future

Against this background, the prospect of farming low-lying marshland offers some hope for the people of Burundi. In fact, the marshy valleys have long been used to grow beans, maize and sweet potatoes during the long dry season for later consumption during the short dry season. This practice, which was environmentally sound, provided a regular harvest, but also ensured the preservation of the marshlands.

The practice of growing rice during the rainy season, followed by a crop of maize and beans during the dry season, is a form of integrated agriculture. It should be economically viable and environmentally sustainable while ensuring product quality, delivering a good yield, limiting any risks involved and allowing a high degree of social integration. These are the criteria which need to be examined in determining whether high-altitude rice cultivation in Burundi succeeds or fails.

Rice crops have been grown in this region, on the shores of Lake Tanganyika and in the Ruzizi valley (altitude 800 m), for more than 200 years, having been introduced by successive migrations of people travelling along the old slave route from Zanzibar. Certain varieties, known as 'pandabilima' (which in Swahili means 'he who climbs the mountain') can be grown on land up to a height of 1300 metres. They cannot, however, be planted on the higher central plateau because low temperatures at night render them completely infertile.

It is not surprising that the new scheme to grow rice at high altitudes was greeted with interest. Indeed, it became almost a craze among farmers -to the extent that in 1990, rice crops covered more than 20 000 ha of Burundi. The area planted with rice fell subsequently, and in some regions the crop disappeared altogether. This was due largely to the appearance of the fungal 'rice blast disease', which can wipe out an entire crop, and to inadequate planning and misguided husbandry. The extensive planting of only one variety left the crop particularly vulnerable and once the disease did take hold, it was virtually impossible to eradicate. Needless to say, in a country where access to pesticides is non-existent, the introduction of a new crop cannot be based on a single variety; if it is to establish itself successfully, varietal diversification is vital. We should point out here that attempts were made in 1984 to improve varietal diversification

in the framework of the EU's Scientific and Technical Programme run by DG XII of the Commission. At that time, it was necessary to familiarise farmers with the techniques for growing the new crop and this aspect of the programme was funded by the EDF, in particular through three integrated projects. These related to agriculture and pastoral forestry and were initiated during 198889 in three provinces of Burundi.

Without going into the technical details of the programme, it suffices to say that growing rice at high altitude in the tropics differs from rice-growing in temperate regions. The low night-time temperatures characteristic of high altitudes mean that the crop is subject to constant stress. In temperate regions, the stress caused by cold weather is a problem only at the beginning and end of the growing cycle. As for selection methods, rice varieties have been produced that are resistant to rice blast disease - which remains the main problem. Also, by mixing the varieties grown, the farmers have created a wide diversity which offers a stable basis for a sustainable crop.

Transformation of an ecosystem

From the viewpoint of development aid specialists, turning marshland into cultivable land means draining it (digging a ditch and fitting pipes). But this leaves the land open to erosion, causes silting in rivers and ultimately leading to desertification. By changing water levels in a region and disturbing the thermal equilibrium, marshlands cease to be marshlands. The method may have been justifiable before rice growing became possible. Indeed, it was employed in the natural marshlands of Buyenzi by some experts who specialised in upland rice. But it also resulted in large-scale destruction of one ricevariety-Yunnan 3-by rice blast disease in 1990.

Development projects which set themselves spectacular objectives can involve major alterations to the landscape. More often than not, these need to be rectified later. Thus, when it was decided to cultivate vast expanses of papyrus, the plants were moderately successful only thanks to constant artificial assistance. Put simply, the land could not sustain the crop on its own. In the process, the marshes were turned into floating peat bogs.

The option chosen here was to adapt the small valleys for rice cultivation and teach the farmers the relevant techniques. Together with their families, they have eagerly embarked on the work needed to prepare the terrain for cultivation, although there are still some land tenure issues that need resolving. (Some people have refused to commit themselves to marshland reclamation projects as long as the land does not belong to them). It should be stressed that growing rice along a strip of water is an option which is in harmony with environmental needs. It promotes percolation of the water, thereby restoring underground water levels and preventing pollutants from being washed down towards the Nile or Zaire basins. It is therefore in keeping with global strategies for conserving resources and ensuring sustainable development.

In the marshlands, farmers traditionally plant beans and maize in banked-up beds during the dry season (from June to November). By skilfully selecting and growing different bean varieties, the farmer can stagger his crops and thereby ensure a continuous harvest from September until the time the maize is harvested. The marshes are then left fallow during the heavy rains which reach their peak in April. A rice variety which can be harvested in six months could thus be fitted in during this perriod with out disturbing the traditional hill-farming work schedule.

Since farmers on the high plateaux had not traditionally grown rice, it was necessary to teach them the techniques needed to produce a successful crop. They were also informed of the benefits that improvements such as dykes, water supply pipes and drainage pipes could have on crop productivity. They have since applied this knowledge in their cultivation. During the dry season, without disrupting the infrastructures on which their rice cultivation is based, they have rebuilt banked-up beds and grown the traditional bean and maize crop. The system has been in place for about ten years and no drop in yield has been recorded. The yield averages 4.5 t/ha for rice, 1 t/ha for beans and 0.4 t/ha for maize-figures which are quite remarkable when compared with the yields of crops grown on the hills in acid soil with increasing levels of aluminium toxicity.

By alternating two different farming systems, the problem of weeds -and therefore hoeing-and of pests is greatly limited. The extensive mixing of the soil that takes place accelerates the recycling of biogenic material-and the marshlands stay as marshlands!

Manageable land development

There are three main types of marshy valley, each requiring specific programmes. The first consists of valleys lying above 1400 m with a rainfall in excess of 1500 mm. These areas are characterised by a clay soil, are constantly fed with water (with a high iron content) from the mountains, and are often very rich in organic matter. They require drainage using ditches and filtration channels, with changes of gradient so that the mountain water tables can be tapped and the water levels controlled. This is important to prevent a build-up of ferrous toxicity in the soil, which is extremely harmful to rice. A farming system involving paddy fields and banked-up beds can be accommodated perfectly in these types of valleys. Then there are the valleys lying between 800 and 1400 m with a rainfall of between 1100 and 1500 mm. These are known as 'dambos' in Swahili, and they extend from Northern Kenya right down to Southern Zimbabwe. Strewn with giant termite nests, the land here is well-suited to rice cultivation as long as water levels are carefully controlled. All the available water needs to be harnessed via filtration canals dug into the hillside. These allow the paddies to be irrigated speedily and, during the dry season, they can also be used to irrigate between the rows of ridgeplanted crops. It would, however, be very difficult to irrigate the entire valley during the dry season and so it is pointless digging a drainage ditch. The third and final type consists of small alluvial plains tucked away between the hills and stretching along the escarpments. Here, the level of soil fertility is determined by the heavy erosion resulting from farming on burnt land, and the practice of setting fire to the hills in order to 'regenerate' pastures. To grow rice in such locations, a filtration canal needs to be dug into the hillside, into which water then collects from the water table. The paddy fields also need to be terraced. These alluvial plains lend themselves perfectly to a farming system in which paddy fields are alternated with banked-up beds. All these land-adaptation schemes can be easily implemented and maintained by the farmers themselves.

A sociological revolution

Although rice grows quickly, it is highly labour-intensive. Thus, when

the young rice plants need to be planted out-which happens to coincide with the end-of-year school holidays-the whole family takes part. What is more, rice has become extremely important in sociological terms: reserved in days gone by for special occasions, it now forms part of the nation's staple diet, being mixed together with beans and dressed with palm oil and tomato sauce. The rice harvest is also a time for merrymaking and festivities which go on for the best part of a week.

Rice cultivation has also engendered a vital sense of solidarity among farmers as far as sharing water is concerned, and rice-growing cooperatives have been a runaway success. These enable farming operations to be synchronised and running costs to be reduced, in particular by reducing the number of bird scarers needed. The crop, furthermore, can be harvested when fully ripe. On individual plots, farmers usually only allow the rice to mature to 75% before harvest for fear of theft. Finally, the cooperative helps to ensure that infrastructures such as drains and canals are properly maintained and that water supply installations are treated with respect. Each cooperative is run by a representative appointed by the group of farmers. These supervisors are then responsible for organising all operations: choosing and storing seed for the following season's crops, getting information about new varieties, consulting each other and pointing out any problems they may have to those in charge of research and advisory services. The area allotted to each cooperative depends on the number of households in the group and also takes into account the area available, with 10 ares per family being the usual maximum for planted-up paddy fields. Cooperatives may range in size from 5 to 25 families.

Cooperatives like this are just the beginning. Networks of rural organisations, in which the farmers club together to buy equipment and fertilisers, need to be developed on a larger scale and they could provide a springboard for the development of the secondary sector, which is vital to the development of the country as a whole.

We would do well to recall that the cassava mills which have been so successful in Burundi and which still run today without any 'technical assistance' had equally humble beginnings.

The future

It must be acknowledged that the people who migrated to this 'wild frontier' of rice cultivation in Burundi also introduced into these regions diseases such as bilharzia and malaria (the mosquitoes carrying the parasite were transported in the luggage of people travelling from the capital to the provinces). Despite this, rice cultivation at high altitude has proved a veritable lifesaver for Burundi. In the year that the FAO plans to stage a summit on famine, it is appropriate to highlight the important role of rice-growing in the food production strategy of this country.

Until recently, Burundi ensured that it had enough to feed its people through a delicate balancing act between growing food crops, leaving land fallow and rearing livestock which produced manure. At present, however, increased agricultural production is only possible by increasing the surface area of the country under cultivation-at the expense of fallow land and livestock farming. Such a move risks reducing soil fertility and could lead to the substitution of crops of high nutritional value, such as beans, with higher yield crops such as cassava or sweet potatoes which suck the subsoil dry of minerals and nutrients.

In short, traditional farming methods in Burundi are arguably now out of balance and the situation is getting worse. This may, indeed, be a root cause of the ethnic crisis. A systematic policy of re-establishing marshlands and organising rural communities around high-altitude rice cultivation would allow the country to look ahead with optimism to the next 20 years. Suitable varieties are currently available and the altitudes at which rice can be grown have been pushed back in Burundi as far as 1700 m. What is now needed is the funds!

J-P.T. & M.A.

A view from UNESCO.

The article which follows is an abridged version of a text compiled by Carlos Amaldo, who heads UNESCO's research into communication and the free flow of information. Mr Arnaldo highlights some of the main aspects of the UN agency's support for the development of a free press in the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions.

The resolution passed by the ACP/KU Joint Assembly in March 1996 in Windhoek, Namibia, reflected the spirit of many of UNESCO's communication programmes in these regions. Echoing the principal tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the resolution declares: 'freedom of expression is a precondition for holding free and fair elections'; 'the monopoly of information media is a barrier to the development of democracy,'; 'there is a need to create a climate in which all part)" can participate fully in political life.' It further holds: 'communication media must not only inform the electorate in an impartial and objective manner' but also; 'freedom of expression and the existence of free communications media are vital preconditions for the development of a democratic society.'

The resolution was timely, responding to a need to remind political leaders, as well as civic society, of the relation between free communication media and truly democratic practices. Just five years ago, on 3 May 1991,

African journalists and media adopted the Windhoek Declaration at the UN/ UNESCO seminar on promoting an independent and pluralistic African press. Likewise, journalists and media practitioners of each major region adopted the Declarations of Alma Ata (October 1992), Santiago (May 1994) and Sana'a (January 1996), all of which affirmed the unwavering belief of professional communicators in freedom of expression, press freedom, independence and pluralism of the media, and the contribution of such freedoms to democratic processes. At their 28th General Conference, UNESCO Member States further declared that, 'press freedom is an essential component of any democracy.' All these declarations contain action programmes to strengthen press freedom in these regions.

Africa

Turning to look at some practical initiatives, a media project entitled 'Independent Press in Africa', which was put in place after the signing of the Windhoek declaration, soon attracted the interest of a number of donors (Italy, USA, France). Under this project, the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) organised four sets of courses for journalists in 1994. In April 1995, IPDC arranged a multi-theme workshop for 33 English-speaking journalists and editors from Central and West Africa on marketing, distribution techniques, managing mass media enterprises in Africa, new communication technologies, journalism and ethical issues.

There are now plans afoot to study the situation of the press in Mauritius, Madagascar and Comoros, and to publish several handbooks about press enterprises. Efforts will also be made to attract increased donor contributions so that the successes achieved by these initial training activities can be strengthened and shared with other regions.

A further example of positive action in support of the media is the work of MISA (the Media Institute of Southern Africa-featured in more detail in the following article). This organisation has been receiving UNESCO support since 1994 under a funding arrangement with the Danish International Development Agency. The project seeks to strengthen links among the region's independent media so as to enhance the free flow of information. It also aims to boost cooperation and information-sharing with similar groups in developing and developed countries worldwide, to strengthen the ability of the region's independent media to stand on its own feet and to improve professional standards.

MlSA, which was set up in 1992, has been monitoring and safeguarding press freedom in the region, facilitated by an electronic network for distribution of information on press freedom issues. It has mounted seminars and training workshops for professional journalists on computer-aided design, strategic financial management, journalism ethics and advertising management. MISA's campaigning material includes a bi-monthly magazine, Free Press: the Media Magazine of Southern Africa and a booklet, So this is Democray, which is a compilation of its 'action alerts' curing 1994 and 1995.

Another UNESCO initiative is the 'Communication and Good Governance in West and Central African Countries' project, supported by Germany. This aims to strengthen the human and technical capacity of the media in these regions so that they can make a contribution to good governance. The three year project is to be implemented in 10 countries - Benin, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Sao Tome & Principe and Togo.

Together with other institutions such as legislatures, the judiciary and civic organisations, media bodies like MISA have a useful role to play. They can enhance transparency and accountability by systematic analysis and reporting of government programmes, policies and pledges, and by encouraging public discussions which help people to make informed decisions about public issues and about how their leaders discharge the power vested in them. Fulfilment of these functions requires access to the media, and qualified, well-trained practitioners who can effectively use the media for information, education and communication on good governance issues.

Caribbean

Turning our attention now to the Caribbean, the question of media freedom recently came to the fore in Trinidad and Tobago when 13 editors and journalists on The Guardian lost their jobs following publication of a number of controversial articles (some reports said they 'constructively resigned'). The events cast a shadow over the famous Carnival. Indeed, as one journalist put it, the Carnival quickly ceded to the 'sacrificial rites' of Holy Week. Six of the paper's youngest reporters were among those who lost their jobs-but out of the furore, a new newspaper was born.

A 'Comparative Study of Media Laws in the CARICOM countries' by Ainsley Sahai, commissioned earlier by UNESCO, became a reference in the debates that followed. The study highlighted that all Caribbean countries guaranteed freedom of expression in their national constitutions. Indeed, Trinidad and Tobago's constitution explicitly guarantees press freedom as well. The Media Association of Trinidad and Tobago (MATT) organised two meetings. The first of these, on 10 April 1996, was a public forum on issues of press freedom. Although a full cross-section of society was not present, and not all the issues at stake were fully debated, it was nevertheless a start. Those who took the floor came from many sectors of society -women, the unemployed, workers, community organisations and at least three different religious groups. About a quarter of those who contributed spoke as individuals. While many criticised the press for errors in reporting, all confirmed the need to uphold a free press vis-a-vis both political pressures and economic and financial interests.

The public gave strong support to MATT and demanded that the forum be replicated in other parts of the country. It was the first time that the public had been given the opportunity to speak out on these issues. It was not so much the content of the discussion which counted, but the very fact that the event took place, bringing the media closer to its 'customers'. The meeting gave the public an opportunity to put over their own perceptions of press freedom, impartial reporting and the strengthening of democratic processes.

Two days later, with support from UNESCO, the Media Association staged a journalists' symposium, moderated by George John, consulting editor at The Guardian. David de Caires, publisher of Guyana's Stabroek News was invited by MATT as an external consultant. Drawing on past and more recent examples of uneasy relations between a free press and governments, Mr de Caires concluded with a headlinehitting statement; the relations of the press with government should not be too cosy, the press must maintain its adversarial position.

Many journalists took the floor to stress Trinidad and Tobago's constitutional guarantees for both freedom of expression and press freedom. They also stressed the need to safeguard editorial independence, not only in the printed press, but also in broadcasting, and urged the repeal of 'antiquated' libel laws-a point also made in the Sahai study. The preparation of a Freedom of Information Act was strongly urged to ensure access to public information.

These events appear to have strengthened the resolve of the jobless journalists. They grouped together to set up a new weekly newspaper, called The Independent. The new publication focuses on investigative articles, comment and reviews. In addition, a monthly called The Formatt was launched by MATT to disseminate specialised news on press freedom issues and to provide print support for future public fore. Both newspapers brought out their first editions in early May amidst the celebrations of World Press Freedom Day.

Pacific

In the Pacific, issues of freedom of expression and press freedom are no less salient, although a key issue for practitioners there is the modernisation of infrastructures. This is needed to ensure that this vast island region does not find itself in the slow lane of the information highway.

The computerisation of radio newsrooms, in places such as the Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Tonga, is a priority. The Cook Islands already has a fully computerised newspaper operation. Indeed, this is the first newspaper in the Pacific with the capacity to transmit photographs from various parts of the country to the newsroom electronically by phone.

Considerable concern has been expressed about the inadequacy of national television programming. There is a need for the people of the Pacific to see themselves and their culture, and not just the imported fare distributed by most international TV services. With UNESCO support, women media producers from seven island countries were able to meet to work out ways of cooperating on a series of television documentaries that they themselves produced and exchanged within the region. Preparations are now under way for the annual evaluation and awarding of prizes at the end of 1996.

C.A.A.

by David Nthengwe

The Media Institute of Southern Africa

Officially launched in September 1992, the role of the Media Institute of Southern Africa is primarily that of coordinator, facilitator and communicator in the promotion of media freedom and diversity, (as envisaged in the 1991 Windhoek Declaration). MISA operates in 11 of the 1 2 SADC countries and is currently investigating setting up a chapter in the twelfth-Mauritius- which joined the Community 1995.

The chapters are serviced by a regional secretariat based in the Namibian capital, Windhoek. The secretariat is accountable to a policy-making governing council of elected representatives from each national chapter, while funding for MISA and its projects is channeled through the MISA Education and Production Trust, overseen by a board of independent trustees. The organisation is currently almost entirely donor-funded, with UNESCO, NORAD, SIDA, the KU, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, IBIS, and the Australian and German governments being the main contributors. Other income is generated through the sale of subscriptions to MISA publications and services.

The Institute's main work is in the field of advocacy; highlighting violations of media freedom and free expression, and exploring ways of ensuring that these fundamental freedoms become entrenched throughout Southern Africa. In 1994, MISA became a member of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) network in a bid to increase international awareness of media freedom violations in Southern Africa. Membership of IFEX has enabled MISA to distribute as well as receive information on media freedom issues in a quick and relatively cheap way via the Internet.

'Action alerts'

In 1994 and 1995, MISA issued via IFEX and its own electronic mail network, the MISANET (see below), more than 190 'action alerts' relating to media freedom infringements in Southern Africa, and effective campaigns against some of these violations have resulted. In August 1994, Lesotho journalist, Rabuka Chalatse, was shot by soldiers while covering a demonstration. An alert issued by MISA triggered a swift response, and within 24 hours, funds had been raised to pay for emergency treatment which saved the young journalist's leg. In November 1995, Angolan freelance journalist, Mario Paiva, had his life threatened by people who, it was alleged, were state security agents. MlSA's alert prompted protest from throughout the world, and resulted in several governments offering Paiva sanctuary in their embassies in Angola. The threat against the journalist was subsequently lifted.

MlSA's advocacy work has also shown that democratisation does not necessarily result in guaranteed media freedom and free expression. In Zambia, for example, which had a multi-party election in 1991, arcane laws inherited from previous regimes have been used against the private media in particular, and free expression, in general. As this article was being written, Fred M'membe, the Editor-in-Chief of Zambia's privately-owned daily 'The Post', and two of his colleagues, were starting an indefinite prison term for contempt of Parliament. The sentence was passed not by a court of law, but by the Speaker, under legislation inherited from British colonial rule. Their 'crime' was to comment on criticism made in Parliament of a Supreme Court decision which declared unconstitutional, laws requiring anyone wishing to stage a demonstration to obtain police permission first.

Five months prior to his arrest, M'membe received the MISA Press Freedom Award, which is presented annually to individuals or institutions considered to have made an outstanding contribution to the advancement of media freedom in Southern Africa. M'membe was the third recipient of the award.

Free flow of information essential

As the Windhoek Declaration points out, 'the establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press' is essential to economic development, as well as for the growth of democracy. Accordingly, MISA argues that the free flow of information is vital to the development process. Effective communication within SADC-a 'development community'- has been hampered by the region's poor postal and telecommunications services. MISA considers that these logistical barriers to the free flow of information are a form of censorship. In a bid to break through the information voids which have kept Southern African media workers and their audiences isolated from each other for so long, it has made particular use of advances in information technology, including, most notably, the Internet.

Over the past two years, MISA has been linking member organisations up to electronic mail (e-mail). This allows members throughout the region to exchange news, photographs and other information. To date, 25 MISA member organisations are linked to this network, called the MISANET, although further growth has been hampered by members' unfamiliarity with e-mail, and the lack of local technicians to train people and provide user support. Nonetheless, computerised communications have proved to be an appropriate technology, and development of the MISANET remains a top priority. By making some services available to non-MISA subscribers, MISA also intends to generate income and thus reduce its current dependency on donor funding.

Focus on training

The coordination of training and material support to independent media is another area where MISA looks to develop media freedom and diversity. The region's independent media sometimes operates in politically and economically hostile environments. Its survival-and thus the sustenance and growth of media diversity-hinges on these organisations becoming highly professional, well-managed concerns.

Working through training institutions based primarily in the region, MISA coordinates workshops and other training programmes aimed at improving the skills of media workers, particularly in the fields of management and finance. Workshops in strategic and financial management, project management, advertising, marketing, sales and subscription management, ethics, subediting, and computerised design were staged during 1994 and 1995. For 1996, training is scheduled in economic reporting, project management, photography, advertising sales, circulation and sales management, computer-aided design, developing world and financial and strategic management. Instruction will also be provided to media workers without formal training. Meanwhile, research is to be carried out into setting up a media ombudsman for Southern Africa, printing press initiatives, media training needs, and the difficulties faced by women media workers in the region. The last-mentioned is in line with MlSA's policy of encouraging gender awareness and equality within the Southern African media.

Private and community-based media organisations face constant problems securing adequate finance. As businesses, they often do not qualify for donor support, while banks are reluctant to lend them money. Therefore, MISA is looking to set up of a Media Development Fund to which independent media can apply for loans, credit guarantees and grants. A study is currently being conducted into the feasibility of such a fund, which MISA hopes to have up-andrunning by early 1997.

Broadcasting in Southern Africa is still largely state-controlled. Moves by some of the region's governments to 'deregulate' broadcasting have been erratic, and many private broadcasting licenses granted in the process have gone to organisations or individuals closely linked to the authorities. MISA is now drawing up a policy aimed at seeking the effective liberalisation of broadcasting legislation covering public, private and community broadcasting throughout the region.

As part of this process, MISA will, this year, stage a conference on broadcasting and community media, to coincide with its Annual General Meeting-which has become one of the largest gatherings of media workers on the African continent.

D.N.

by Thomas M. Neufing

Volunteers have become a major component in international development efforts. They make up a significant proportion of the total human resources available for development cooperation (up to a fifth of the skilled international personnel serving in developing countries). In the early days, volunteer service was strongly influenced by the idea of oneway technical assistance. Specialists, mainly from the North, served in developing nations where their expertise was desperately needed but not yet found among local citizens. Much has changed since.

After the US Peace Corps, the UN Volunteers Programme (UNV) ranks as the second largest volunteer-sendina agency with some 4000 professionals in the field every year. Its universality and internationality is reflected in the high number of UNV specialists (74%) who come from developing countries. The scope and size of the international volunteer contribution to development cooperation (notably areas such as HIV/AIDS and the environment), has increased significantly over the years as a result of the changing development challenge. The re-thinking of the role of technical cooperation is equally central to the volunteer debate and this has led to much greater flexibility in the ways in which volunteer services are provided. The important role volunteers can play in peace building efforts with a long-term development dimension, complementary to humanitarian relief, is increasingly being recognised.

Working with rather than for people

With the UNV's 25th anniversary, and the relocation of its headquarters to Bonn this summer, it is an appropriate time both to assess and to acknowledge the contribution made by these volunteers. Since the programme began in 1971, some 14 000 professionals have dedicated a period of their lives to serve as a UNV. The programme is administered by UNDP, and is therefore intimately linked to its structures, particularly in the field. Regarding community-based initiatives, the comparative advantage of UNVs is that of working with rather than for people over an extended period, thus facilitating their initiatives. The experience of many development agencies shows that in promoting socio-economic change at the village level, the type of person needed is one who-through long-term commitment and sensitivity -can learn as much from local partners as offer advice to them.

International volunteers are engaged mainly in rural development tasks. Those working through specialised NGOs such as the Red Cross, and Medecins Sans Frontieres have proved to be highly effective agents, supporting governments faced with disaster situations. In the case of UNV, the value of using volunteer specialists from other developing nations, as a way of encouraging technical cooperation amongst developing countries, is particularly recognised. Most volunteers- perhaps two-thirds - serve in least developed and small island countries. And about three-quarters serve in rural areas, working mostly in programmes of agricultural and community development, health, education and the supply of basic services. Since the end of the Cold War, a growing number have been deployed in emergency relief, refugee and rehabilitation programmes. UNVs make up 10% of the UN's civilian component in Cambodia; 4096 of the field staff of the World Food Programme and almost 100% of outreach workers attached to the UN Mission in Guatemala. UNVs are increasingly involved in human rights promotion, the organisation of elections and conflict resolution.

There is a consensus among the main international humanitarian and development actors that their programmes should be mutually supportive. For example, development efforts must respond to humanitarian crises by remaining on the scene and supporting immediate needs, as well as aiding in the prevention of crises which are known to be looming. Emergency humanitarian assistance should also pave the way for longer term development by viewing the immediacy of the moment through the lens of future sustainable rehabilitation. Both sets of activities should, ideally, be launched and implemented in tandem with local bodies.

External assistance efforts must include strengthening local capacity to cope with problems. Empowerment strategies which inform, educate and facilitate the people's own vision of peaceful and sustainable living environments (including respect for human rights) are fundamental to the future of communities coping in the aftermath of crisis.

Relief, rehabilitation and development?

The UNV programme has been active in exploring the efficacy of volunteer support to communities in crisis in order to bridge the gap between immediate needs and longer term developmental goals. In 1994, the UNV held its 4th Special Consultation, entitled, Between Crisis and Development - Volunteer Roles and UNV's Contribution. At this event, donor governments, UN agencies and cooperating partners from civil society had an indepth discussion of the issues surrounding volunteer efforts, and the complementary nature of emergency interventions and follow-up measures. The participants reconfirmed the need for local capacity building. They also affirmed the usefulness of the UN Volunteer contribution in crisis prevention, emergency rehabilitation and 'building bridges' to sustainable development. The work of UNVs in preventive action and promoting post-conflict development was highlighted. There has been a significant increase in demand for specialist volunteer services in all types of crisis. These may be economic, natural or man-made, but they all have in common the need to provide essential relief and rehabilitation services for basic survival (to refugees and resident populations). In many countries, disasters and internal strife have put so much pressure on essential public services that the longterm capacity of the people to recover may be threatened. Governments in developing countries and donors both believe it is fully justified to use volunteer specialists to help provide such services during the adjustment period.

'Mixed' teams

The contribution of both international and national volunteers is often essential to link immediate relief efforts to future long-term development. National volunteers-people working in their own countries within the UN framework-complement the international approach by providing the key grassroots perspective. UN Volunteers who speak local languages, live and work in remote communities, are familiar with community structures and are known to local leaders, play a key part in facilitating preventive action and providing follow-up in the aftermath of a crisis. UNV specialists are well-placed to build effective partnerships with national and local actors. In the last two years, some 2000 UN Volunteers have worked in various parts of the world in prevention and preparedness, peacekeeping, electoral support, human rights, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Burundi offers an example of an initiative designed to stem a crisis through local capacity-building. The UNV is financing a project there which supports the mediation and dialogue efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) through the recruitment of UNV peace advisers and conflict resolution facilitators. This project is being run successfully out of the SRSG's office, extending public awareness of the reconciliation process. It includes use of the mass media to promote understanding, and brings local actors together to work for peaceful solutions.

The tasks undertaken by UN volunteers all fit into the spectrum which has 'crisis' et one end end 'development' at the other. The work, moreover, is undertaken in partnership-with civil society (NGOs and community-based organisations), government departments, UN agencies and regional international organisations (such as the KU).

Through efforts that aim to link relief, rehabilitation and development, new productive partnerships are emerging to enhance coherence, coordination and complementarily.

The growth of professionalism

30 years ago, the typical profile of an international volunteer was that of a generalist graduate from an industrialised country seeking first-time experience abroad before settling down to a career. Over time, the governments of developing countries made clear their need for practical and often specialised skills aimed at giving them the ability to manage their own programmes. They increasingly expressed impatience at hosting untrained volunteers. Professionalism became the key word. Unfortunately, the word 'volunteer' is still a source of confusion: it is often equated with 'amateur'. This is a perception that now needs to be corrected. The personnel sent out by most agencies that supply volunteers are likely to be in their thirties, with post-graduate qualifications and several years' practical experience in their fields. The typical UNV specialist is an example par excel/ence of this trend: 39 years of age, holding a Master's degree and with more than ten years of experience in a particular discipline.

It was not just the dedication, but also the professionalism of the hundreds of UN Volunteers serving in Mozambique that impressed Aldo Ajello, the former UN Special Representative in Mozambique (now EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region). 'If I were to run another mission,' he said, 'I would ask immediately for volunteers.' In terms of monitoring-which was vital in building up the trust and confidence needed to ensure the election results were accepted-'UNV electoral officers were our only real presence and they proved to be extremely professional.' ~ T.N.

Study by the World Wide Fund for Nature

by David Reed

On 29 May, David Reed of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) was in Brussels to present the results of a study undertaken by the WWF, with the support of the European Commission, the longterm consequences of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on the environment and the use of nature/ resources. Conclusions were drawn from nine country case studies from Cameroon, Mall Tanzania, Zambia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Venezuela, Vietnam and Pakistan. We publish here an abridged version of Mr Reed's general presentation.

SAPs, often implemented at the instigation of the international financial institutions, have responded to the pervasive economic problems of the 1980s and to profound changes in the economy in recent decades. The programmes have generally been successful in improving macroeconomic indicators in developing countries. The marketorientation of economies has been increased through liberalised trade and capital flows, privatisation, reductions in regulation and price setting, and cuts in government budgets and programmes. For most developing countries, these changes were essential to economic recovery and adjustment to the new global marketplace.

Sustainable development in the social, economic, and environmental sense, has, however, been ignored in SAPs. Many reform programmes have been accompanied by increases in poverty and unemployment, worsening income distribution, and the collapse of social services, environmental protection and state institutional capacities. These immediate costs of adjustment inhibit countries' long-term ability to expand productivity and employment opportunities, as natural resources are exploited indiscriminately to meet short-term needs.

Environmental impacts

The environmental effects of structural adjustment vary from country to country depending on the specific components of the reform package, the structure of the economy, and the implementation process. The WWF's country case studies reveal particular mechanisms through which structural adjustment has altered resource-use patterns. Some more general patterns also emerge from the studies. Everywhere, cuts in government institutions and funding have reduced the state's capacity to facilitate the transition process, to compensate for market failures, and to provide for long-term and social sustainability.

Many reforms associated with structural adjustment have the potential to improve both environmental and economic outcomes. However, the failure to implement complementary environmental policies or strengthen institutions and regulations, has created a very mixed environmental record. Increases in poverty, greater production incentives, and the loss of government regulatory capacity, have all aggravated patterns of poor resource use.

Extractive and agricultural economies generally increased production in response to greater exposure to global markets. Without proper policies in place, this increase has put a strain on fragile ecosystems. Environmental pressures include increased land degradation and deforestation for agriculture, livestock and timber production; increased production of non-renewables without long-term investment of the proceeds or environmental safeguards; and increased pollution and damage to the ecosystem from unregulated tourism.

The burden of fiscal retrenchment and price changes under structural adjustment have fallen most heavily on the poor, particularly women. The strong association between poverty and environmental degradation has been revealed, as efforts to maintain livelihoods have led to deforestation, land degradation, overhunting and other pressures on endangered species, as well as the unmanaged extraction of nonrenewable resources. Increasing poverty and unemployment associated with adjustment has also added to population pressures in urban areas with insufficient infrastructure exacerbating problems of pollution, disease and congestion.

The implications of disregarding the environmental and social impact of adjustment are examined in the various case studies. Structural adjustment has been sustained by the promise that market-orientation and export-led - growth will raise living standards. Evidence from the studies, however, strongly suggests that long-term productive capacity is being destroyed by short-term exploitation of natural resources. Not only environmental but also economic and social sustainability are threatened by the loss of environmental goods and services. Drawing down natural capital has been encouraged by government policies that promote exports and open resources up to international markets. And the process is accelerated by the growing population of poor and unemployed who rely on natural resources for survival.

Recommendations

Following its study, the WWF offers a series of recommendations to reduce the environmental costs of structural adjustment and economic integration, and to reorient structural adjustment aims towards sustainable development. Most urgently, environmental issues must be integrated into structural economic reforms - environmental assessments must become part of the programmes. A strategic vision of the role that natural resources and environmental goods and services could play in the transformation of developing economies is essential to designing appropriate strategies. Efforts to industrialise economies must include consideration of the environmental implications. Social services and environmental institutions must be maintained during the adjustment process to prevent increases in poverty and environmental degradation that have both short-term and long-term consequences for development. Essential services include credit and marketing support to small farmers, income-generating opportunities for women, food-assistance programmes, and promotion of distributional equity. The state's role in providing services which neither the private sector nor civil society can provide, must be maintained.

Given the great variety in economic structures and in the capacity of markets and civil society among developing countries, adjustment strategies and government roles must be tailored to each case. Everywhere, countries must implement national institutional reforms for environmental management. Civil society must be strengthened to allow participation in the adjustment process. International financial institutions promoting and designing SAPs must reform their policies and approaches to implementation in the light of the clear evidence that macroeconomic reforms are having a profound effect on the environment and on the possibilities for sustainable development. Continuing failure to correct these problems on a national level accentuates the concern for addressing issues of sustainability on a global level.

D.R.

Dak'Art 96

The first World Festival of Negro Art, held in 1966, was essentially a political exercise. In the post-independence period, it was felt necessary to show the world that the people of Africa (both the continent and the diaspora), had a rich culture which had long been suppressed. The festival - which has never been repeated-is viewed with a great deal of nostalgia by supporters of modern African art and black intellectuals. The better, brighter future, which seemed at the time to be just over the horizon, never quite lived up to expectation. Even before financing problems had surfaced, the festival's fate had already been sealed by petty political rivalries and a greedy pursuit of the limelight. Years later, attempts to relaunch the event met with a lukewarm reception. It was already the beginning of the end as far as ideologies were concerned. In complete contrast, Dak'Art 96 (Dakar, 915 May 1996) set its sights firmly on the market place, nowadays the yardstick by which all success is measured. Its goals were simple: to break into the art market and overcome the generally held prejudice that contemporary African art lacks modernity.

An international market for African art does exist, but it concerns itself solely with ancient art- and Africa itself profits little from such trade. Indeed, it would be more accurate to speak of plundering than of trade. The seminar, organised last year by the Terveuren Museum in Brussels on the looting of African works of art, revealed the true extent of the phenomenon. Despite the fact that pirated works fetch considerable sums on the black market, contemporary African artists are faced with a 'Catch-22' situation. Major galleries in Europe, America and Japan do not exhibit their work because African art is ignored by the leading art periodicals; and their work never appears in these publications because it is never exhibited. One reason for the fact that African art is not put on show is that virtually no funds are allocated by international institutions to sponsor exhibitions by the artists in question.

Many third-world governments do not dare, are unwilling or are unable to include culture on their list of priorities within international cooperation agreements. One exception is Burkina Faso which now boasts a cinema industry as a result. Senegal is trying to follow in its footsteps. But there are not many places in Africa where artists are promoted for the quality of their creative output. The majority of initiatives have, in fact, been on a voluntary basis. The magazine Revue Noire is one of the most significant examples of this approach. A group of aficionados of contemporary African art - indeed with a passion for art pure and simple, whether African or European-decided to try and break the vicious circle. They looked at two options: the establishment of an art gallery of worldwide renown or of an equally prestigious arts publication, and came down in favour of the latter. Thus Revue Noire was born. However, its success was generally given very slim odds: it was seen as too glossy, too expensive and too intellectual. The sub-text here of course, is that a publication about African art had no right to be glossy, expensive or intellectual, especially since the money could have been used for something far more 'useful' to the development of these countries.

Others, such as Marie-Claire Mwanza from l'Espace Alizes in Brussels, have attacked the problem from a different angle-by exhibiting contemporary African art. Prior to her initiative, there was not a single gallery in Brussels that specialised in this sector of the market, and there are still none that figure on the shopping lists of the world's great collectors. Whatever the price set for a contemporary African work, it is generally perceived as being too high. The contrast with the prices demanded for works by even the youngest European or American artists, even for their very first exhibitions, speaks volumes. African art is too expensive in relation to what exactly ? The answer is in relation to the status accorded to it, which is of course determined by the art world. In other words, a big fat zero if one considers the fact that African art is never exhibited.

Thanks to Revue Noire, African art has been brought to the major galleries of the Western world. Similar projects have been launched or are in the process of being launched in various countries of the West, such as the magazine NKA in Brooklyn, for example. Exhibition organisers, museums, galleries and those looking to stage art festivals now know on whose door to knock, and the last few months have proved extremely promising. The Guggenheim Museum in New York is currently hosting a major exhibition of African art, and Africa 95, held in London, was swiftly followed by Copenhagen 96. The Guggenheim Museum, moreover, is in a completely different league to the Museum of African and Oceanic Art in Paris or the Museum of Central Africa in Tervueren, Belgium (formerly the Colonial Museum)-it is one of the world's most prestigious temples of modern art. What is more, London's Africa 95, which was so disparaged by African art specialists, who considered it nothing more than a meeting place for traders, did, whether we like it or not, act as a significant catalyst. And what about pirated works of art, such as those plundered from the Niger Valley ? These have found a 'home' in public as well as private collections, pointing to a real need to 'clean out the Augean stables'.

A few African artists are beginning to get themselves known within 'the market', but there are still not enough of them. It was with great foresight that the organisers of Dak'Art placed these artists at the top of their invitation list. Another shrewd move was to invite the art market's arbiters of taste to select those African artists who should present solo exhibitions, and to ask celebrated art critics and collectors to form part of the international panel of judges.

It is probably true to say that Africa has rarely known such a dynamic period of creativity which places it at the forefront of global aesthetic trends. The aim of the Biennial Festival was to underline this fact beyond any doubt. Among those artists who are currently in a position to break into the market, the Senegalese sculptor, Ousmane Sow, probably heads the list. Paradoxically, however, Ousmane Sow's work was not presented at Dakar although he himself was there, his tall, striking figure standing out from the crowd. Despite the fact that he lent his support to Dak'Art 96 and that the opening gala was partly dedicated to him with the magnificent film of Beatrice Soule, Ousmane Sow resolutely refused to display his own work. He has no wish to take part in gatherings of 'African artists'. He is an artist and he is African, but he is not an 'African artist'. 'A Japanese artist is a contemporary artist in this universal world', he argues, 'so why should I allow myself to be pigeon-holed in a ghetto ?' No matter how satisfied and pleased champions of contemporary African art may be with the organisation behind the Biennial Festival, they cannot deny that Ousmane Sow has a point. Having said this, there is no contradiction here, but rather a complementary vision. Sow's stance and the idea behind Dak'Art are part of a two-pronged attack, to borrow a military term. The organisers of the Biennial and Sow himself doubtless saw it in this way, and decided to join forces.

Each time Beatrice Soule tackles the work of an artist, she explores it in a very unusual way, reinventing the arts documentary. Her films are reminiscent of the music of Nino Rota in Fe//ini's films, Rota subjugating himself to the service of the director's work, sublimating his own originality through this extreme humility. It is impossible to picture the images of Federico Fellini without Rota's haunting music. Beatrice Soule saw in Sow's work a love affair between an artist and his sculpture, coming up with the idea of placing Sow's sculptures in the savannah and imagining the intimate interaction between Africa's natural world, which is at the heart of the artist's inspiration, and his works, which the natural world is able to absorb back into itself. The result of this juxtaposition is that the physical work of art is eclipsed by sheer creative force and spirit. The genius behind the work becomes the work, merges with it and is reincarnated in it. The one thing that Soule did not film was Ousmane Sow himself, her images concentrating solely on the creative act. It would be illusory to attempt to explain a Beatrice Soule film, especially this film. When she unveils how the artist tames physical matter, reinventing materials in order to create a work of art, technique simply recedes into the background, becoming blurred and intangible. Whereas others would have adopted a scientific or factual approach, her camera perceives the abstract aspects of the piece-and its gestation. The film was due to be broadcast on the international FrancoGerman arts channel Arte.

If Ousmane Sow's sculptures are characterised by their gigantic proportions, then those of Georges Adeagbo, a Beninois artist whose name is also beginning to be heard in the commercial art establishment, are characterised by their 'fugacity'. Adeagbo's artistic constructions are as fleeting as puffs of smoke, like voodoo symbols scratched out in the sand. His art is symbolic and ephemeral. Once one of his works has been exhibited, all that remains of it is a hollow shell which he has to reinvent over and over again. Adeagbo constructs ideas, using a host of assorted materials which he painstakingly selects over months, even years. Yet despite the meticulous care with which they are put together, as far as the artist is concerned, the materials per se are of no importance. He could convey exactly the same idea using other elements. An Adeagbo piece is not merely a pile of objects. It is neither conceptual art, nor scrap art. It consists rather of 'installations' which rise and spread outwards. Sometimes, he uses specially constructed sculptures. At other times he employs everyday objects- shoes, saucepans, stones, spectacles or footballs. He also works with written material; manuscripts, parchment, pieces of newspaper and books, portraying the written word as both a creative force and a deceptive screen. Adeagbo himself is a man of few words. Perpetually crouched on the ground, he constructs, modifies, touches and observes his creations. Why should these constructions remind us so much of paintings? They are as much a pile of objects as a painting is an accumulation of layers of paint. It is by forgetting the paint that we are able to admire the picture and it is by looking beyond the materials used by Adeagbo that his work truly reveals itself. Indeed, it is a sign of his genius as an artist that the materials never intrude upon our contemplation of his work. In Dakar, Adeagbo's work was shown in the AIDS exhibition organised by Revue Noire.

Another artist who took part in the AIDS exhibition, and whose art could well be the impetus behind the new universal aesthetic, the avant-garde (if such a concept has a meaning), is Pascale Marthine Tayou from Cameroon. He was given the honour of presenting one of the five solo exhibitions. Tayou was sponsored by Yakuyi Kawagushi, the curator of the Setagaya Museum in Tokyo, who exhibited his work at the forum organised within the overall framework of the exhibition. While the term 'installation' may best describe the works of Georges Adeagbo's, Tayou's work falls unquestionably under the heading of sculpture. This is despite the fact that the two artists use virtually identical materials. Tayou sculpts from wood, covering his pieces with all manner of manufactured and salvaged objects such as shoes, nails, plastic bags and enormous condoms, or with natural objects such as bits of roots and stones. He then paints the arrangement. The work is dense, unyielding and mesmerising, often etching itself into the onlooker's mind. His sculpture lacks heavy ornamentation, yet its starkness has a rich quality, the theme encompassed by a jumble of material standing out clearly, like the outline of a silhouette. Take his work 'Fight against AIDS'. The piece consists of a wooden frame in the shape of figure-of-eight, with each horizontal line doubled, defining a key element in a tragic body with bulging eyes and a Pere Ubu belly. In contrast to this suffocatingly tragic figure, the brightly-coloured shoes of a Harlequin with a faded costume offer a comical note.

There were other creators who could well ruffle a few feathers in the art market that ultimately makes or breaks an artist: Tamsir Dia of Cote d'lvoire (whose screaming figures are reminiscent of Munch), Cheikh Niass of Senegal, Mathilde Moro of Cote d'lvoire and Abdoulaye Konate of Mali. The last mentioned was honoured with the highest award of the festival.

A decision was taken that Dak'Art 96 should encompass other areas of creativity, such as music, design and fashion, in addition to the visual arts. At the gala evening held to inaugurate the Festival, there was a fashion show choreographed in the manner of a ballet. The staging of this can only be described as mawkish. The audience were treated neither to a real performance, nor to a good fashion show. The second fashion spot, which was supposed to present an overview of African design, was also quite pitiful. If the event's organisers decide to keep these parallel areas of creativity in the Festival, then their decision will be solely thanks to the success of the International Design Exhibition. Apart from two or three 'exotic' pieces, this was generally of a very high standard.

The European Community's choice in awarding the prize for creativity to a designer, Vincent Amian Namien from the Cote d'lvoire, was particularly revealing. This artist strips everything down to its bare essentials, creating a line that is so purified as to leave only the quintessence of form. Thus, he creates a chair that is nothing more than a perfect metal triangle, with four boards and four metal wires-and yet offers perfect comfort.

Claire Kane, a fashion designer of Franco-Senegalese descent, had the verve to go it alone and show her collection at the prestigious Salon of Design. Her clothes are characterised by the rejection of all superfluous detail, achieving a fluid line that stylises movement. Following an aesthetic code that has been decanted from the melting pot of the collective costume heritage of the entire continent, Claire Kane is directly involved in the creation of her designs, from the weaving of the cloth to the last finishing touches. In fact, she admits that her true passion is fabric rather than fashion, her favourite material being woven pagne. She often uses silk-screen printing to introduce pattern. She then adds words to the patterns in her designs and, abracadabra, one would think that this is the way it has always been done in Africa. A subtle modernity, combining both past and future, seems to be a recurring motif in African creativity. International artists, still few in number, travel from Dakar to be dressed by her.

If, in the future, the Festival's organisers decide to concentrate solety on the visual arts, this would come as no surprise. On the other hand, it would also make sense to continue to include design and fashion. A country's cultural heritage should be considered one of its raw materials and a source of economic wealth, and unimaginative accountants may have to resign themselves to this fact. Herein lies a possible answer to the question: 'why hold a Biennial Festival of Contemporary African Art?'

Hegei Goutier

by Robert Rowe

Many ways of raising money to fight AlDS have been tried, but one of the most unusual must surely be the approach taken by an official of the European Commission. Robert Rowe, who until last year was an assistant editor on The Courier, put on a oneman show in Brussels and then rook it to the other side of the world to raise money for a voluntary organisation working on AIDS prevention and care in Malaysia. Here is his story of fighting the virus with the power of the theatre.

'By the year 2000, South-East Asia will be host to the majority of the world's AIDS cases.' So runs a stark prediction from the World Health Organisation, quoted in a recent paper from a grouping of NGOs affiliated to the Malaysian AIDS Foundation. It goes on to predict that 'the region faces a potential HIV spread of titanic proportions.' In Thailand, a country with a large population and a sad reputation for prostitution, the HIV threat was recognised relatively early and effective public awareness campaigns have successfully reversed the rise in the incidence of infection. But in neighbouring Malaysia, where stricter religious and social attitudes have inhibited wide public discussion of the disease and its methods of transmission, over 13000 people were HIV-positive at the last count-and that is just the figure derived from the small percentage of the population who have been tested. Activists say the true number is certainly higher and it is growing every day.

The first cases of HIV in Malaysia were found among intravenous drug users and sex workers, and one of the earliest organisations to begin working with people engaged in these high-risk activities was Pink Triangle. This is a voluntary, non-profit-making body which started up in 1987 by setting up AIDS prevention and support programmes for and with the general public and the gay community. Its name, in fact, refers to the pink triangle badge which men sent to concentration camps in Nazi Germany for homosexuality were made to wear. The group has always depended heavily on volunteers to plan and carry out its programmes, which now also involve running a support group for people with HIV or AIDS and a street outreach programme and drop-in centre providing AIDS information, basic medical care, temporary shelter and food for sex workers, injecting drug users and transsexuals. The centre can also provide legal referrals for members of these groups summonsed to appear in court. For the general public, talks, workshops and poster and photo exhibitions are held in schools, hospitals, factories, youth and corporate organisations and other NGOs. Pink Triangle trains its volunteers, too, to provide counselling and information about AIDS and sexuality to anyone who calls up on a confidential telephone line.

The work is serious and vital, but the atmosphere is far from gloomy in Pink Triangle's premises in a lively part of the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur. Though funding comes from several sources at home and abroad, including the European Union, the organisation still has to generate a lot of its own money, and one successful method they have used is to put on imaginative events where fund-raising can be combined with an opportunity to raise public awareness. Last December, for example, they marked the week surrounding World AIDS Day with a string of shows, dance parties, talk-ins and street activities called Pinkfest '95. In venues all over the town, and on television and radio, well-known personalities joined a hundred of Pink Triangle's own speakers and performers to provide education without moralising. The aim was to personalise the issue of AIDS by showing how anyone could be at risk, but at the same time dealing in facts, not fear. Thousands of attractively designed and very frank leaflets and posters put across the virus-busting message in catchy graphics and pithy phrases in several languages.

I happened to be in Kuala Lumpur around New Year and saw a video of some of the Pinkfest highlights which set me thinking how admirable an impression of solidarity and self-help the anti-AIDS struggle in Malaysia conveys, and to wondering whether, back in Brussels, it might not be possible for us in Europe to do something to help. It particularly impressed and touched me that while Pink Triangle delivers its message to every single member of Malaysian society, it makes quite clear, even by its name, that it has a special care for some of that society's most downtrodden members, people for whom no one else had ever ventured to speak. Public silence, opprobrium and ridicule make it especially hard to get the safe-sex message through to gay men, especially the young, to transsexuals and sex workers, and as long as there is no cure the only way of containing the spread of infection is by education- and by changing social attitudes. The many women whose husbands or partners are careless about infection also stand to benefit from greater openness and more factual information. But organising all this takes money.

It happens that among the multinational English-speaking expatriate community in Brussels there is a thriving amateur theatre scene-in fact they say that if two British people found themselves on an otherwise deserted island, one would immediately put on a play for the other, and the same seems to hold true of the Irish and the North Americans. However, it was less certain that anyone apart from me would want to exert themselves, for the many weeks required to stage a production, on behalf of an AIDS charity in a remote Asian country, so l decided to go ahead by myself and perform a one-man comedy. The play was Brief Lives; it has nothing whatever to do with AIDS, but in its day it was a huge success in London and New York. Adapted in the 1960s by the British actor Patrick Garland from the dusty old memoirs of a real historical figure, John Aubrey, it depicts a day in the life of this 1 7th-century English scientist, historian and wit. As he potters about, an extremely old man, in a garret full of manuscripts and curios, he reminisces about his contemporaries in hilarious and touching vignettes, the potted biographies which give the play its name. Aubrey died in penury, but the picture he gives of a vanished age is now reckoned to be the equal of the record we find in the diary of the better-known Samuel Pepys.

It is also a great deal funnier, and when I showed the script to various friends I was astounded and moved to discover how many of them wanted to be involved in the project. Eventually we put together a team headed by the director, Anne Wilkinson, a music impresario married to a coal expert from the European Commission, with production, design, stage management, lighting, sound effects, costume, music and offstage voices-not to mention publicity and box office-provided by other friends from the European institutions or the private sector. The five performances were given in June in a small theatre just adapted from a pottery workshop, and altogether the Brussels showing made a profit of some 110 000 Belgian francs.

We had expected just to send this donation to Pink Triangle through the post, but to our immense pleasure they said they would like to see not just the money but, if possible, the play too. By ingenious compression the designer, Burt Baum, managed to cut the essentials of the set down to three sheets painted to give a three-dimensional effect, we put the voices and music on cassette, rolled up the costume tightly and worked out that the whole play, thus reduced, could be got into one suitcase. There is a little theatre company in the Pacific ACP state of Vanuatu called Wan Smol (One Small) Bag which actually gave me this idea. So off I went to Kuala Lumpur with this bag, and did the play another five times there.

The staging in Malaysia was done by an adventurous outfit called Instant Cafe Theatre. This young company has a reputation for pushing forward the boundaries of public discussion with topical plays and supports Pink Triangle's aims and work. Brief Lives was well outside their usual repertoire, as well as being spoken in the English of 300 years ago. My worry was that bringing such a Western and Eurocentric entertainment might be resented as cultural imperialism in a country with three great and fascinating cultures of its own, Malay, Chinese and Indian, each with its own style of drama. But it turned out there was a local tradition of amateur dramatics in English, particularly Shakespeare, and that English is the usual lingua franca for speakers of different Asian languages. What went down unexpectedly well was the depiction of an old man nearing death and reviewing the best moments of his life; as the character puts it in the play, 'When a boy, I did always love to converse with old men, as living histories,' and Maiaysians have a particular regard and affection for the elderly.

I came away from Kuala Lumpur with many charming memories: the unfailing, sweet-natured enthusiasm of the audience; the relief on the first night as I stood on stage in a floor-length costume of three layers, designed to suggest London in midwinter rather than to cope with the equatorial heat of the Malay peninsula, and realised that the stage was air conditioned. The night when this air conditioning blew out a vital candle on the stage, and a man in the front row lent me his highly un-17th-century lighter to get my clay pipe going. The Chinese friend who gave me a genuine antique opium pipe to add to John Aubrey's collection of exotic curios. The delicious succession of Asian chicken dishes which the stage manager produced for me to eat on stage, cooked in very un-English coconut milk or glazed with rice wine. The work permit which specified I could perform as an artiste but must not 'sit out' or dance with the audience! The theatre's resident singer asking if she could add the play's Elizabethan theme song, with lute accompaniment, to her repertoire.

Taking this play to another continent was a fascinating cultural experience for me as a European, and I hope for the audiences too it was something more than just a painless way of being relieved of money in a deserving cause. At any rate the theatre asked if they could have another play soon, one in which Malaysian actors could be incorporated as well. As for Pink Triangle, some of its leading lights were packing their bags to go to Vancouver for this year's International AIDS Conference, but before they left it was a pleasure to hand over the proceeds of the whole venture and to hear that the organisation will use the money to develop a drop-in centre for people approaching them in person for the first time. Some first-timers are understandably timid about coming to the unfamiliar (and clearly signposted) premises for help or information, and a private space where they can talk in confidence is something Pink Triangle has always wanted to provide but could never find the funds for, as the project or programme money they get from their regular donors is invariably tied to what outsiders might think were more urgent priorities. It is not only the headline grabbing schemes which have useful effects: a quietly welcoming space where someone can be himself or herself may do more to dispel an individual's fear and ignorance than publicly visible campaigning, especially where religious and social pressures against certain types of nonconformity are strong. In fighting HIV/AIDS, we must try whatever works. And empowerment must begin with the self. It was a great privilege to be welcomed in like any other volunteer wanting to help bring about a necessary change.

R.R.